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Introduction 
Recent events in Somalia have highlighted once again a glaring gap in the African 
Union's capabilities. Yet again the continent's main regional body has shown itself to 
be unable to deploy a capable peacekeeping force at short notice. 
In December 2006, in response to what seemed like the imminent fall of the southern 
city of Baidoa to the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian troops 
launched an offensive into Somalia in support of the country's beleaguered interim 
federal government. Apparently catching the UIC off guard, Ethiopian soldiers -
backed by tanks, artillery, attack helicopters and fixed-wing ground attack aircraft -
quickly drove the UIC forces out of Mogadishu and most of the territory it had 
previously occupied. The remnants of the UIC fled to a rugged, forested corner of 
Southern Somalia on Kenya's border. 
However, despite the initial success of the Ethiopian invasion, Ethiopia's position in 
the country quickly became uncomfortable. Pressure from parts of the international 
community, the early stirrings of a guerrilla war against Ethiopian troops by 
disaffected Somalis, and the potential for a regional conflict involving Eritrea, have 
all contributed to a strong desire by Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from Somalia. Part 
of the justification given is the fact that the AU Peace and Security Council has 
authorised the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a 
planned force of some 8,000 African peacekeepers. Unfortunately only Uganda has, at 
time of writing, actually contributed troops to AMISOM, and there appears little 
likelihood that AMISOM will graduate into a meaningful stabilisation force. As a 
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result Somalia once again faces the prospect of a security vacuum in which chaos 
reigns - an all too common occurrence in Somalia's recent history. 
The case of AMISOM is by no means the first time this capabilities gap has become 
evident. While the AU has unquestionably played an increasingly important role in 
peacekeeping on the African continent, its responses have typically been slow, 
logistically creaky, and piecemeal. This problem has not, of course, escaped the 
attention of decision-makers in Addis Ababa. It was precisely to address situations 
such as that now developing in Somalia that the AU developed it's doctrine of the 
African Standby Force. 
A central element of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC), the 
African Standby Force (ASF) is intended to be a body of multidisciplinary military 
and civilian contingents available for rapid deployment when authorised by the PSC. 
The central rationale for the ASF was to enable the AU to respond rapidly to 
situations of conflict, in order to prevent a developing situation of conflict from 
becoming catastrophic. This capability was considered particularly important given 
the fact that it takes on average three to six months for the UN to get peacekeeping 
boots on the ground once a resolution has been passed, allowing far too much time for 
the situation to deteriorate. At the heart of the ASF concept is the idea of five regional 
standby brigades, each consisting of anywhere between 2,000 and 6,000 troops and 
their equipment. Together this should give the PSC between 10,000 and 30,000 troops 
available for rapid deployment to hotspots around the continent. 
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The Standby Force concept is a good one. Unfortunately it's a good idea that, since 
being launched in 2003 and despite some genuine progress, has yet to become a 
functional reality. Despite an announcement by South Africa's Defence Minster 
Mosiuoa Lekota in late 2005 that the SADC brigade is ready to deploy, and the actual 
launch of SADCBRIG in August 2007, the fact that there has been no suggestion of 
deploying the brigade to Somalia makes it clear that this is not the case. As usual the 
biggest obstacle to implementation is a lack of resources. African countries are 
generally poor, and having the capability to project military power is expensive. 
Consider, by way of comparison, the NATO Response Force. 
NATO describes its Response force as a "coherent, high readiness, joint, 
multinational force package" that is "technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, 
interoperable and sustainable".1 This capability allows NATO to project a 25,000-
strong force across the globe, where it can sustain itself under high-tempo combat 
conditions for a period of 30 days. 
There is no question that the RRF is a powerful force that offers a potentially valuable 
tool for addressing international conflict. But the fact that the world's wealthiest 
security grouping can only manage to sustain a rapid reaction capability of 25,000 
troops, illustrates how ambitious the AU Standby Battalion Concept is. 
The biggest problem is not primarily one of finding the troops, though with countries 
like South Africa increasingly stretched to meet existing peacekeeping commitments, 
this is not an inconsiderable issue. The biggest difficulty, however, is having the 
1 www.nato.in t/issues/nrf/index;htm. 
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capability to move necessary forces to where they're needed and to keep them 
supplied. The old adage remains applicable - 'amateurs talk strategy, professionals 
talk logistics'. Given the vastness of Africa, there are realistically only two ways to 
move and supply a force like one of the standby battalions, by air or by sea. 
Because the naval forces of African nations, where they exist at all, have virtually no 
sea-lift capability, the transport of choice for the standby brigades is airlift. But while 
the AU's members have more airlift than sealift capability, that's not saying much. 
The South African Air Force is relatively well off in this regard, but even the SAAF 
capability falls well below what might be desired. The introduction between 2010 and 
2014 of the recently-ordered batch of between 8 and 14 Airbus A400M tactical 
transport aircraft will help, but will not be enough to resolve the problem. Consider 
for example the proposed order of battle of the East Africa Brigade of the ASF. Apart 
from over 2000 troops, there's the logistical challenge of moving close to 160 
vehicles, not to mention food, ammunition and other supplies. 
Even if sufficient logistics could be found, other problems remain. The harsh reality is 
that the troops contributed to AU and many UN operations display low levels of 
professionalism, inadequate warfighting skills, and are poorly equipped. The contrast 
is made clear in this telling quote from a report by Greg Mills, describing the 
intervention of British forces in Sierra Leone: 
Well-led and resourceful, the UK troops soon gained local support as their 
methods proved effective. As the situation stabilised in mid-2000, one 19 
year-old Sierra Leonean observed, "We love the British soldiers - they are our 
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salvation.... They are well-equipped. They are not as fearful as the UN 
soldiers. They do not steal from us. We want them to stay." 
Given the economic realities of the African continent, and the inefficiencies of the UN 
system, it is likely that it will take quite some time before swift and capable responses 
to conflicts on the African context can be expected with any regularity from the AU 
and UN. Western military capabilities, like those inherent in the NATO Response 
Force described above, are certainly adequate to the task of rapid and decisive 
response to such conflicts. Unfortunately the West has shown very little willingness to 
risk the lives of Western troops in African conflicts, and there appears to be little 
likelihood of this changing in the foreseeable future. 
This is, clearly, a bleak picture indeed. Is there nothing that can be done? Is Africa 
simply doomed to bear the terrible burden of armed conflict that has so long blighted 
it, with no reprieve in sight? 
Recently a suggested response has been put forward from an unexpected quarter. In 
March 2006 Cofer Black, former senior antiterrorism official at the CIA and US State 
Department and now Vice Chairman of one of the world's largest private military 
companies, Blackwater USA, suggested that Blackwater could provide a "a small, 
nimble, brigade-size force"3 for rapid deployment to trouble spots around the world. 
2 http://wvvw.crimesofwar.org,/africa-mag/afr 03 miils.html. While Western nations did contribute 
forces to the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the vast majority of the boots on the ground 
were African forces or forces from other developing world 
nations.dittp://www.uri,org./Depts/dpko/missions/uTiamsil/). Accessed 17 July 2007. 
3 http•//contetit.haniptonroad$.coiTi/storv.cfm?storv= 102251 &ran=202519&tref=po. Accessed 17 July 
2007. 
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According to the same report, Chris Taylor4, Vice President of Blackwater, confirmed 
Black's position and specifically mentioned the possibility of deploying in support of 
AU and UN objectives in Sudan. 
There is little doubt that putting together a force of this nature is well within 
Blackwater's capabilities. Owned and staffed primarily by former members of the US 
Special Forces community, Blackwater boasts some of the most advanced military 
training facilities in the US. It is believed to have a fleet of around 20 aircraft,5 
including a fixed wing gunship in the style of the AC 13OH Spectre6 as well as 'Little 
Bird' helicopter gunships under contract in Iraq.7 Blackwater operatives have been 
employed on close protection and training contracts all over the world, including 
contracts "to combat the booming opium trade in Afghanistan and to support a SEAL-
like maritime commando force in Azerbaijan, an oil-rich former Soviet republic".8 
Further personnel are available via Blackwater's 'international division', Greystone 
Ltd, which recruits and employs non-US personnel.9 Blackwater has developed and 
manufactures its own armoured vehicle, the Grizzly.10 Blackwater personnel in Iraq 
are reported to undertake convoy protection duties in RG-31 Armoured Personnel 
Carriers, manufactured in South Africa and under great demand in Iraq due to their 
high level of protection against improvised explosive devices.11 One of Blackwater's 
many divisions has developed and is manufacturing a remotely piloted airship vehicle 
4 Whom I had the opportunity to meet on a visit to Blackwater's training site in Moyock, North 
Carolina in 2005. 
5 littp://content,hamptonroads.com/stor>'.cfm?stoi,y= 102168&ran-18268. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
6 Footage of this aircraft is featured on Blackwater's promotional video. 
http://\vwwxnn.coni/2Q07/W'ORLD/nieast/Q1/24/iraq.helicopter.crash.ap/index.htinl. Accessed 17 
July 2007. 
8 http://content.hamptonroads.com/story .cfn^story— 108242&ratr-18183. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
9 http://vvww.greystone-ltd.com/. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
10 http://www.blackwaterusa.com/grizz1y/. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
1 'http /•'www.canada.com/nationdlpost/news/storv.html?id=45c 1631 a-4d5f-49db-8bfd-
i.:-;6y0<i44ec«%k 29717. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
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designed to provide persistent surveillance over conflict zones, in much the same way 
as the US military uses unmanned aerial vehicles like the now famous Predator UAV 
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(unmanned aerial vehicle). In addition Blackwater has, in its Terrorism Research 
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Centre, an existing in-house intelligence gathering and analysis capability, a 
capability that will grow massively with the launch of Blackwater's private 
intelligence branch 'Total Intelligence'.14 It is even rumoured that Blackwater has 
acquired a roll-on, roll-off (RORO) ferry, and is in the process of converting it into an 
amphibious warfare vessel capable of supporting both humanitarian and combat 
operations. 5 It takes very little imagination to see the potential of a private military 
company like Blackwater providing a militarily and logistically capable force to 
intervene in the crucial early stages of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere in the 
developing world. 
Of course it goes almost without saying that Black's suggestion of developing a 
capable brigade-sized military force staffed entirely by private contractors has been a 
very controversial one. This is but one controversy within the generally controversial 
rise of the modern private military corporation, which has its roots in the emergence 
of the South African group Executive Outcomes in the early 1990's.1 Since then, 
particularly with the US-led deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a 
huge surge in the employment of private companies supplying services that were 
traditionally supplied by men and women in uniform. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times 
12 http://www.blackwaterusa.com/airship/. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
13 http://www.teiTorism.com. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
14 http://wvvw,phillv.coni/phil]y/opi»ion/20070603i WhaHfourmercenaries .turnon^us^.html 
Accessed 17 July 2007. 
15 This was told to me in 2007 by a senior member of the US military who had the previous year been 
briefed by Blackwater Vice Chairman Chris Taylor during a visit to Blackwater's headquarters in 
North Carolina. I have no independent confirmation of this, however, and include this information 
more as an illustration of the potential of private military companies like Blackwater than as a claim of 
fact. 
16 http://web.ardrive.org/web/19981212024722 http://www.eo.com/. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
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reported on the 4 July 2007 that, even with the increase in US forces resulting from 
the 'surge' into Baghdad, contractors in Iraq now outnumber US troops.17 
The growth of the private military industry is without question one of the most 
significant developments in armed conflict in recent years. As Musah and Fayemi put 
it, "Private military companies (PMC's) are ... assuming an important role in the 
balance of power both within individual states and in international security as a 
whole" (Musah and Fayemi 2000, 1). It is not surprising therefore that academic 
analyses of the phenomenal rise of the private military industry have been appearing 
on the scene at a regular rate. The first substantial account and critique of the industry 
to gain significant influence was Peter W. Singer's Corporate Warriors (2003). Since 
then important contributions to the debate have been made by the likes of Deborah 
Avant (2005) and Christopher Kinsey (2006), and there are in addition a number of 
important edited collections in print.18 
One of the issues that is regularly raised in the academic literature on private military 
companies is a concern about the impact of the privatization of military force on 
appropriate civil-military relations. It is my view, however, that this question has not 
been adequately analysed at the theoretical level, and it is the goal of this thesis to 
address that shortcoming. Deborah Avant frames the question well when she writes 
that 
the implications of privatizing security for the control of force are debated. 
Pessimists claim that the turn to private security threatens to undermine state 
17 http://gamatiasz.wordpress.com/tag/los-angeles-tiTnes/. Accessed 17 July 2007. 
18 For example Bryden and Caparini 2006. 
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control and democratic processes. Ken Silverstein characterizes this process as 
one "by which the responsibilities of government are transferred to corporate 
hands." ... Optimists, however, declare that private options offer solutions to 
intractable security problems that can operate within national interests and/or 
the values shared by the international community. ... Who is right? (Avant 
2005,4-5) 
An important limitation on the scope of this project must be made clear from the 
outset. Many private companies active in conflict zones around the world balk at the 
label 'private military company', preferring instead to be called 'private security 
companies'. For many of those companies this is an important and accurate 
distinction to make, and there is an unhelpful tendency to clump all companies that do 
business in conflict zones as 'private military companies', whether they provide 
armed guards, military trainers, convoy drivers, or cooks. I have specifically stuck to 
the term 'private military company' in this thesis, for the simple reason that the focus 
of this work is explicitly intended to address those companies at the 'sharp end' of the 
stick. Put another way, the focus of this thesis is on the implications, in terms of civil-
military relations theory, of private companies providing genuinely military services 
such as the provision of armed force. It is for this reason that this introduction has 
focused on drawing out the notion of the 'Blackwater standby brigade'. It is precisely 
this 'pure' form of private military service provision that provides the greatest test for 
civil- private military relations, and it is therefore this form of private military service 
provision that provides the focus for this thesis. 
The Way Ahead 
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"... any serious evaluation of privatization's impact must compare private 
alternatives against a common standard - most suitably the other available 
alternatives than an unachievable ideal. " (Avant 2005, 6) 
The first two chapters of this thesis provide essential background to the central 
question at hand. Chapter one examines the emerging battlespace of the 21st century 
and attempts to discover its essential features. Supporters of the so-called Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) argue that technological advances have radically altered 
the nature of warfare, such that military victory will go to high-tech forces with a 
minimal presence on the ground. If this is so, then there seems little reason to be 
particularly concerned about private military companies like Blackwater, for it is 
unlikely in the extreme that they will be able to develop the required level of 
technological capability to deploy self-contained military forces of this kind. Against 
this view, however, I deploy an important recent argument by Stephen Biddle that 
shows that the nature of military conflict is essentially unchanged since the emergence 
of what he calls 'the modern system' in the latter years of the First World War. Added 
to this is the near certainty that much if not most future armed conflict will be fought 
in urban environments. Drawing on Alice Hills' analysis, I show how this increases 
the likelihood of the employment of private military companies in such conflicts. 
Perhaps more important than the material conditions of the future battlespace are the 
social and moral conditions in which future conflicts will take place. The second part 
19 This term, which has achieved wide currency in military circles in recent years, reflects the 
increasing complexity of contemporary armed conflict. No longer is it adequate to refer to the 
battlefield, with its implication of primarily land-based conflict on open terrain. Armed conflict is now 
multi-dimensional and multi-faceted, and the idea of a battlespace better captures this reality. 
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of chapter one focuses on this issue, arguing that the asymmetrical relation between 
the moral perspectives of developed nations and those of their adversaries means that 
the push for humanitarian interventions from the developed world will increase while, 
at the same time, the reluctance to risk developed world military personnel in distant 
conflicts will also increase. Together, I argue, these considerations provide a strong 
indication that private military companies are likely to continue to be an important 
feature of the future battlespace. It follows from this, therefore, that there is good 
reason to closely consider the implications of such forces for the civil-military 
balance. 
That said, if it is clear that the private provision of military services is inherently 
immoral, then no matter how much the nature of the future battlespace might favour 
the employment of private warriors, states and international organisations ought to 
declare the private military company to be an illegal entity and take steps to ensure its 
demise. This is certainly a widely held view in both the academic world and the 
popular press. Once again this question is essential to our enquiry, for if states ought 
to eradicate private military companies, then there is little need for a close conceptual 
analysis of their impact on civil-military relations. Chapter Two examines the 
question of whether the private provision of military services is inherently immoral by 
asking what, precisely, is held to be immoral about this activity. I consider a number 
of alternative explanations, but conclude that none of them give good grounds to think 
the private warrior to be inherently immoral. 
Chapter Two also makes clear, however, that there may be other, consequentialist, 
reasons for rejecting the use of private military companies. One such reason, and it is 
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the central one under investigation in this thesis, is if private military companies by 
their nature undermine the appropriate relationship between civilian governments and 
their military agents. I begin my investigation into this issue in Chapter Three by 
examining the state of civil-military relations theory. I argue that the recently-
developed approach to this age-old question developed by Peter Feaver - what he 
calls Agency Theory - represents a significant advance over the received view, 
Samuel Huntington's 'professionalism' model. I also argue, contrary to Feaver's own 
view, that Agency Theory is also applicable in new and relatively unstable 
democracies. Feaver is pessimistic about the value of his theory in a context where 
there is not an established culture of submission to civilian rule among military forces, 
and where coups are a real danger. This is clearly an important issue if this theory is 
to be applied to private military companies, for there are many who fear that these 
organisations might grow to the point where they could overthrow legitimate 
governments. I argue, however, that even under these conditions Agency Theory 
remains extremely valuable as an analytic tool. I argue further that Feaver has not 
recognized the potential benefits that regional organisations offer to civilian principals 
in their goal of ensuring military obedience. 
In Chapter Four I begin an analysis of the effect private military relations have on 
appropriate civil-military relations. It must be stressed from the beginning, however, 
that this analysis is limited only to the direct relationship between civilian principals 
and their private military agents. What will not be addressed in this thesis are a range 
of other concerns that have been raised regarding private military companies' impact 
20 Most analysts point to the recent attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea which involved a group of 
mostly former Executive Outcomes members. Pulitzer prize winning New York Times foreign 
correspondent, Chris Hedges, is a good representative of the general fear of private military companies 
- see hftp;./.-'wwwjphj[Iv..com/{>h iJIyi^jnioji/2JW706PJ^ . 
Accessed 17 July 2007. 
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on the broader civil-military environment. A concern that is regularly expressed, for 
example, is that private military companies provide a means whereby a state's 
executive may sidestep many of the checks and balances that most democratic states 
impose on executive decisions to use military force. Other concerns point to 
potentially detrimental effects on the loyalty or morale of state military forces. Thus 
Singer writes: 
The firms entrance as a third party tied to the civilian leadership may also 
leave military leadership feeling isolated or excluded from the inner circle of 
power, causing further resentment. (Singer 2003, 198) 
And 
There is a growing belief that old-fashioned military virtues are particularly 
threatened by increasing military contracting with the PMF industry and the 
overwhelming presence of ex-soldiers in its employment rolls. The argument 
of these opponents, who often include officers presently serving in public 
forces, is that the armed forces' professionalism must not be associated with or 
compromised by commercial enterprise. To do so potentially endangers the 
fabric of communal loyalty. (Singer 2003, 204) 
While these are important concerns, they are not, strictly speaking problems for what 
I call civil - (private) military relations, but are rather about the democratic 
accountability of political leaders or civil - (state) military relations. I will therefore 
not consider them in this thesis. 
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In Chapter Four I present the first stage of an analysis of private military companies in 
terms of Agency Theory. I begin by focusing the strategic relationship that Agency 
Theory reveals as being in operation between civilian principals and their traditional 
military agents (army, air force, navy, marines and other paramilitary services). For 
each central feature of that strategic relationship, I ask the question whether any 
significant difference emerges when private military agents are considered in place of 
state military forces. I conclude that no such difference exists at the strategic level. 
In the final chapter, Chapter Five, I move on to examine the specific mechanisms of 
monitoring and punishment that Agency Theory shows to be available to civilian 
principals in controlling state military forces. Once again, as in the previous chapter, I 
focus on whether there is any significant difference in the applicability of these 
mechanisms to the task of controlling private military forces. While there are certainly 
some differences, I argue that overall there is no reason to think that private military 
forces cannot be controlled in the same way and with the same mechanisms that are 
available to civilian principals to control state military forces. In sum, I argue that, at 
the conceptual level (i.e. setting aside practical problems of implementation that 
might arise), private military companies are no more of a threat to appropriate civil-
military relations than are state military forces. 
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Chapter One 
The Emerging Battlespace and the Demand for Private 
Military Companies 
It has become commonplace among analysts to insist that in recent years warfare has 
changed radically. Of course change in warfare is nothing new - like any human 
activity it is subject to the powerful influences of societal and technological change. 
But this is different. The shifts that these analysts point to are, they insist, radical. 
That is to say, they contend that these changes represent a fundamental altering of the 
nature of warfare. 
Depending on their particular disciplinary perspectives, the actual changes pointed to 
by these scholars differ. For some it is the genocidal practice and ethnic politics that 
are increasingly at the centre of today's armed conflicts that are the most important 
distinctives of these 'new wars'. For others it is the advent of information warfare and 
the rise of the computer-geek 'info-warrior' that represents the vanguard of the 
revolution. Others still point to the new-found focus on human rights in warfare, and 
with it the rise of the applicability of humanitarian grounds for military intervention 
and the consequent decline of the sanctity of the sovereign state. Yet others point to 
the growing involvement of non-state actors in warfare, and argue that this portends a 
future in which states will no longer dominate armed conflicts. And finally (though 
not exhaustively) there are the proponents of the so-called Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) who insist that recent technological advances (such as the 
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development of precision-guided munitions, advanced C4ISR21 capabilities, network-
centric battlefield systems, and so on) have irrevocably altered the nature of 
warfighting itself. 
In the first part of this chapter I will analyse some of the central material changes to 
the emerging battlespace and examine their implications for the private military 
company. In part two I perform a similar analysis focusing on non-material changes to 
the emerging battlespace. 
1.1. Material Factors 
Certainly it is clear that many of these changes, as well as others, are of crucial 
importance in understanding warfare today. For example, the fact that about eighty 
percent of casualties in armed conflict are today civilians, as opposed to around ten to 
fifteen percent at the beginning of the twentieth century (Kaldor 1999, 100), and the 
ever-decreasing likelihood of conventional conflicts between major national armies, 
are examples of important changes that should (though, sadly, all too often do not) 
play an important role in defence planning. But whether such changes to the broad 
shape of armed conflict are indeed revolutionary remains to be seen. Certainly it is 
assumed by many of the pundits of the revolution that these broad changes to the 
nature of contemporary armed conflict do indeed bring with them a radical revision of 
the heartland of war, warfighting. For if (for example) the central goal of armed forces 
is no longer primarily to 'kill people and break things', then does this not radically 
change the nature of victory in battle, and therefore the nature of warfighting? More 
21 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 
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directly focused on warfighting are the supporters of the idea that we are seeing a 
revolution in military affairs in which "modern conventional weapons [have] become 
so accurate and so deadly that human beings [will] simply not be able to survive in 
appreciable numbers on traditional battlefields" (Alexander 2003, 3). 
In striking contrast to these prophets of change stand the authors of two important 
arguments that are the focal point of the first part of this chapter, Stephen Biddle and 
Anne Hills.22 Though the specific focus of these arguments differ, they are united by a 
common assertion that none of the broad changes in the nature of warfare in general 
that we have seen in recent years alter the fundamental nature of warfighting itself. In 
what follows I shall begin by setting out Biddle's argument, then turn to a 
consideration of Hills' work, before offering an analysis of what these authors have 
achieved and in what direction their work points. 
Mid- to High- Level Continental Conflict - Biddle 
Stephen Biddle, former Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the US 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and now Senior Fellow at the Council 
on Foreign Relations, sets out to answer the questions "What causes victory and 
defeat in battle? Why do the winners win and the losers lose?" (Biddle 2004, 1) This 
is obviously a big question, so in order to make his investigation manageable, Biddle 
takes as his basic unit of analysis the operation - "a series of interconnected battles 
resulting from a single prior plan" (Biddle 2004, 6) - and focuses on continental 
22 I have written a fuller critical analysis of these two arguments, published as 'The Future of 
Warfighting,' {Scientia Militaria, 2006, 34 (1), pp 93 - 107). This chapter includes material from that 
paper. 
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conflicts, those that take place on or over major land masses. He also concentrates 
on warfare that falls in the mid- to high-level range, thereby excluding low-intensity 
conflicts on the one hand and global-scale conflicts involving weapons of mass 
destruction on the other. While this narrowing of focus does indeed make Biddle's 
investigation manageable, the selected area of investigation is not arbitrary. To the 
contrary, Biddle argues convincingly that it is military success that falls within this 
range that is the best indicator of military power in general. 
The parameters of his investigation thus fixed, Biddle sets out to discover just what 
factors account for military capability, which he defines as follows: "offensive 
military capability [is] the capacity to destroy the largest possible defensive force over 
the largest possible territory for the smallest attacker casualties in the least time; 
defensive military capability is conversely the ability to preserve the largest possible 
defensive force over the largest possible territory with the greatest attacker casualties 
for the longest time" (Biddle 2004, 6). Historically, the main approaches to measuring 
military capability have been those of numerical preponderance, technology (the 
measure favoured by RMA believers), and (to a lesser degree) force employment. 
Biddle, however, believes that these capability measures, at least as generally applied, 
are of little value. Force employment, Biddle argues, is usually only employed (and 
usually only by historians) as a subjective measure of military capability, and offers 
little by way of predictive power. Numerical preponderance and technology as 
predictors of military success show little more utility. Indeed, Biddle contends that 
they are in fact "no better than coin flips at predicting real military outcomes" (Biddle 
2004, 2). This is not hyperbole on Biddle's part. In the second chapter of the book he 
23 Conflicts that are fought primarily in the air or on the sea are therefore excluded from his analysis. 
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subjects these two central traditional measures of military capability to statistical 
testing by assessing their predictive power when measured against the data collected 
in the University of Michegan's Correlates of War (COW) dataset, which provides 
statistical data relating to sixteen actual wars that took place between 1900 and 1992. 
He concludes, for both numerical preponderance and technology, that applying these 
measures to the COW data produce predictions of victory that are in fact little better 
than a coin flip, and indeed sometimes perform even worse. As if that were not bad 
enough, Biddle also points out important theoretical concerns regarding the numerical 
preponderance and technology approaches: "the two main views imply mutually 
inconsistent policies and conflicting understandings of international politics. Defense 
planners cannot maximise technological sophistication and numerical preponderance 
simultaneously" (Biddle 2004, 19). 
Biddle's explanation for the shortcomings of the generally accepted approaches to 
analysing military effectiveness is, firstly, that the approaches used are either rigorous 
but too narrow, or else broad in their scope but insufficiently rigorous. To address 
this, Biddle's own approach is to use what he calls 'methodological triangulation', 
that is, employing a number of different analytical tools in an attempt to compensate 
for the shortcomings of each on its own. In particular, writes Biddle, "I combine close 
review of recent historiography with formal theory, case method, statistical analysis, 
and simulation experimentation" (Biddle 2004, 9). The second major shortcoming 
that Biddle believes accounts for the poor results of employing existing models is that 
there is an explanatory variable missing from the analysis. In Biddle's view, the 
missing factor is the proper application of the idea of force employment, or, more 
specifically, what Biddle calls the 'modern system' of force employment. This 
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system, he contends, has been employed since at least 1918, but its importance has 
nonetheless slipped the attention of most military analysts, with the result that an 
enormous body of literature in strategic studies and international relations has been 
built on weak foundations. "The modern system is a tightly interrelated complex of 
cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent manoeuvre, and 
combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration 
at the operational level of war" (Biddle 2004, 3). Properly understood, this factor is 
the deciding one in predicting the outcome of military operations. Regarding 
numerical preponderance, Biddle contends that "Superior numbers can be decisive or 
almost irrelevant depending on the two sides' force employment. This in turn means 
that states' relative economic, demographic or industrial strength are poor indicators 
of real military power: gross resource advantages matter only if they can be exploited 
via modern-system force employment, and many states cannot do so" (Biddle 2004, 
3). Likewise, Biddle argues, technology's value is relative to modern system force 
employment: "Taken together these techniques sharply reduce vulnerability to even 
twenty-first century weapons and sensors. Where fully implemented, the modern 
system damps the effects of technological change and insulates its users from the full 
lethality of their opponents' weapons" (Biddle 2004, 2 - 3). 
The modern system works by exploiting properties of military technology that have 
changed little since 1918 and are changing only slowly today. It thus damps the effect 
of technological change: modern-system militaries are far less exposed to the effects 
of increasing lethality, speed, and sensory acuity than are non-modern-system forces. 
This in turn means that the modern system has actually grown more important over 
time: technological change is increasing the vulnerability of non-modern system 
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forces much faster than modern-system ones, yielding an ever-growing gap in real 
military capability between the two. (Biddle 2004, 52) 
Thus, while important, technology is not decisive in the way that advocates of the 
RMA think it is, and it certainly does not negate 'traditional' approaches to warfare in 
the way they believe - indeed, the very opposite is true. Likewise modern system 
force employment is the decisive factor in making preponderance valuable: "Modern 
weapons are so lethal that exposed, non-modern-system forces become cannon 
fodder. For numbers to tell requires modern-system force employment" (Biddle 2004, 
52). 
With laudable thoroughness, Biddle submits his modern system hypothesis to 
rigorous testing by assessing its predictive power against the evidence of three 
carefully chosen case studies, namely Operation Michael (The Second Battle of the 
Somme), Operation Goodwood (the failed Allied attempt to break out of the 
Normandy beachhead in July 1944), and Operation Desert Storm. The first two cases 
were chosen according to Harry Eckstein's method of critical-case analysis - "by 
picking cases with extreme values on the key independent variables, one creates 
conditions where theories should be at their strongest (or weakest), making it 
unusually illuminating if a theory fails to perform as expected" (Biddle 2004, 78). In 
Ecksteinian terms, both the successful German offensive in Operation Michael and 
the failed Allied breakout in Operation Goodwood qualify as 'most-likely' cases for 
orthodox theories of capability and 'least-likely' cases for Biddle's modern system 
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approach. Operation Desert Storm, on the other hand, is not an Ecksteinian critical 
case, as the Coalition attackers were obviously superior in terms of all of the factors in 
question - numerical preponderance, technology and force employment - and so all 
of the theories predict the same result. The value of this case, however, is that it offers 
a way of comparing each theory's prediction of how and why the Coalition forces 
would be expected to break through the Iraqi defences, against what actually 
happened. In particular, Biddle uses this case to test how each theory fares at 
explaining Operation Desert Storm's most remarkable feature, the unprecedented low 
casualty rate suffered by the Coalition forces.25 
For each of the test-cases Biddle begins with an explanation of why the particular 
operation has been chosen as a test case, and then, after giving an overview of the 
operation, goes on to rigorously test the predictions of each of the three competing 
theories against the actual outcome of the operation. In each case Biddle's theory 
significantly outperforms its traditional rivals, despite the fact that two out of the three 
cases are chosen as 'most-likely' cases for the traditional theories, and 'least-likely' 
cases for the modern system approach. 
Not content with this small-n test case analysis, however, Biddle then moves on to a 
series of large-?? statistical analyses, in which "the data contradict orthodox 
24 "A most-likely case is one where extreme values put a theory on its strongest possible ground - if it is 
going to be right anywhere it should be right here. For such cases, a valid theory should fail very rarely; 
if we nevertheless observer failure, this surprising result warrants a greater loss of confidence in the 
theory than would a single disconfirmatory observation under less ideal conditions. Conversely, a least-
likely case is one where extreme values make the theory unusually unlikely to succeed - even if the 
theory were generally valid, under such unfavourable conditions it might well fail anyway. For such 
cases, we would expect weak theories to be overwhelmed by confounding effects; if we nevertheless 
observe successful prediction, this surprise would warrant a greater gain of confidence than would a 
single confirmation under less extreme conditions." (Biddle 2004, 78 - 79) 
25 "In less than six weeks, 795 000 Coalition troops destroyed a defending Iraqi army of hundreds of 
thousands for the loss of only 240 attackers." (Biddle 2004, 133) 
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preponderance and technology theories for twenty-five of the twenty-seven testable 
hypotheses; in only two of twenty-seven were they supported. By contrast, the new 
theory was corroborated for eighteen of twenty-four hypotheses; in three of the 
twenty-four the results were ambiguous or weakly contradictory; in only three of the 
twenty-four were the results unambiguously inconsistent with the new theory's 
predictions" (Biddle 2004, 191). 
The final test Biddle subjects his theory to is that of computer simulation 
experimentation. Using "the most rigorously validated combat simulation available in 
the defense analytic community" (Biddle 2004, 181), the Janus system developed by 
the University of California's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Biddle tests 
his theory and its competitors using the data collected under the 73 Easting Project. 
Specifically, Biddle uses the simulation to test the following counterfactuals: 
1. What if the Iraqis had fully implemented the modern system? 
2. What if the United States had not had such advanced technology? 
The results of the simulation showed, firstly, that had the US Army's 2n Armored 
Cavalry Regiment been up against a modern-system defense, it would have suffered 
significantly more casualties than in fact it did, despite its clear technological 
advantage. Secondly, the simulation showed that, when confronted with advanced 
technology, partial modern-system implementation is insufficient. Finally, Biddle's 
26 "The 73 Easting Project was a collaborative study conducted jointly by the independent Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the US 
Army. Its purpose was to develop a database of unprecedented detail on the conduct of a single battle 
(the Battle of 73 Easting [Operation Desert Storm]), then to use modern computer simulation 
technology to represent that data in a "virtual re-creation" of the minute-to-minute activities of each 
participating tank, armoured vehicle, truck, or infantry team. ... The resulting dataset offers probably 
the most complete and reliable depiction of any combat action in history." (Biddle 2004,182 - 183) 
24 
experiment indicated that less sophisticated or less diverse offensive technology 
reduces the consequences of a defender's failure to implement the modern system. 
Each of these conclusions stress the increased importance of modern system force 
employment in the face of modern technological advances, and in general the results 
of the simulation were once again consistent with the new theory and inconsistent 
with the technological-superiority explanation preferred by proponents of the RMA. 
Urban Operations - Hills 
I now turn to the recent work of Alice Hills, a lecturer at the UK Joint Services 
Commission and Staff College. Where Biddle focuses on the nature of warfighting 
within a certain range (mid- to high-level continental conflict), Hills' focus is on 
warfighting on a particular type of terrain, namely operations on urban terrain. A 
central thesis of Hills' work, however, is that it is not simply a matter of differing 
terrain that makes urban operations unique. For while it is true that fighting in urban 
areas offers unique physical challenges (such as the fact that "Cities represent a 
complex multidimensional blend of horizontal, vertical, interior and external forms, 
superimposed on natural relief in which "Ground manoeuvre becomes 
multidimensional" (Hills 2004, 9)), this is only one of the issues that marks out urban 
operations as deserving special attention. Among the other relevant features of war in 
cities and other urban areas are: 
• Cities carry particular political significance. 
• Urban areas are heavily populated, multiplying the potential for 'collateral 
damage'. 
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• Issues of humanitarian aid and development are tied in with urban conflict in a 
uniquely close and complex manner. 
• Urban environments favour asymmetrical opponents. 
• Standoff-range combat is technically and morally difficult, increasing the need for 
close or dismounted combat, which is invariably attritional and results in higher 
levels of casualties. 
• Logistics becomes both more difficult and more important in urban conflict, 
particularly in the light of the increased humanitarian demands placed on liberal 
participants in said conflicts. 
• Local social, cultural, economic and demographic conditions are significantly 
more important factors in urban conflict than in other types of operations. 
Furthermore, we live in an increasingly urbanised world. Hills points out that "It has 
been estimated that in 2015 the world's population will be 7.2 billion; that is, 1.1 
billion more than in 2000. Approximately 95 per cent of the increase will be in 
developing countries and almost all of it will occur in cities" (Hills 2004, 16). While 
is has been a common goal among Western and other liberal militaries to avoid 
fighting in urban environments as far as possible, Hills argues convincingly that it will 
become increasingly more difficult to do so as more adversaries recognise the 
asymmetric advantages cities offer them. "Baghdad, Beirut, Belfast, Dili, Freetown, 
Gaza City, Grozny, Kabul, Mogadishu, Monrovia, Pristina and Sarajevo - all suggest 
that it will be as difficult to avoid operations in cities in the future as it was in the 
past" (Hills 2004, 4). 
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Despite this, Hills analysis shows that warfighting in urban areas has received 
relatively little focused attention. Indeed, she goes as far as to claim that "There are 
no reliable or coherent theories of urban operations" (Hills 2004, 36). Focusing 
primarily, though not exclusively on Western thought, Hills concludes that what 
doctrine there is focuses strongly on tactical issues relevant to fighting on urban 
terrain, and most of that is extrapolated from conventional manoeuverist doctrine. 
Very little doctrine exists that engages with the broader, and in Hills' view more 
pressing, strategic problems posed by urban operations. Part of the problem, Hills 
argues, is that doctrine is by its very nature reactive and formal. She is therefore 
pessimistic about the possibility of innovative doctrine emerging that will successfully 
address the critical problem of "balancing tolerable levels of casualties and collateral 
damage with military success" (Hills 2004, 57-58). 
Not surprisingly one of the proposed solutions to the quandaries of urban combat is to 
turn to transformational technology. Hills considers the lure of technology and such 
innovations as precision targeted munitions delivered by close air support, unmanned 
robotic weapons systems and netcentric warfare systems. While such innovations 
undoubtedly are of great assistance to the urban warrior, Hills concludes that "There 
is as yet not evidence that technology has or can cause a fundamental shift in the 
nature or conduct of urban operations" (Hills 2004, 84), and that, indeed, urban 
combat remains little changed from what took place in the 1940's in places like 
Stalingrad and Berlin. She is clearly right in claiming that, in urban operations, 
"training and experience are of greater significance than doctrine or technology" 
(Hills 2004, 29). 
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Hills then focuses on emergent trends and issues that may have an impact on strategy 
relating to urban operations. She begins with an investigation into the implications for 
urban operations of the recent emphasis among liberal nations on notions like human 
security and civil society. Several questions are addressed: "What is the military 
utility of the liberal notions associated with expanded definitions of security? Can 
they make the conduct of Western operations more efficient? Could such trends shape 
strategic guidance? What are their implications for future urban operations?" (Hills 
2004, 174). Hills' conclusion here is that, while such issues undoubtedly do and will 
affect political decisions about security operations, "the notion of civil society is 
irrelevant during war, and unhelpful as an analytic tool ... In other words, civil 
society has no operational value, but the concerns it represents have, for various 
reasons, become important and may yet shape strategic guidance" (Hills 2004, 191). 
Hills also considers the vexing issue of controlling non-combatants and minimising 
'collateral damage' during urban conflict. The quandary is summed up well when she 
writes that "Urban war traditionally destroys cities, yet it seems likely that military 
control of a city during policing, enforcement and post-conflict scenarios is easier if 
electricity, water and sewerage systems work; if public-health concerns are lower; if 
logistics are easier; and if populations are generally more compliant" (Hills 2004, 
199) Compounding the problem is the historical point, as Hills observes, that "the 
attacking force in almost every modern urban battle has begun operations with a strict 
set of ROE [Rules of Engagement] designed to limit collateral damage, but all have 
invariably been eased in the course of operations because minimising friendly 
casualties always takes precedence over the desire to avoid civilian casualties and 
collateral damage" (Hills 2004, 209). Once again technology - and here non-lethal 
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weaponry comes to the fore - does not provide a straightforward answer to this 
problem. In Hills' view, "NLWs appear to offer a middle ground as far as control is 
concerned, yet it seems unlikely that they will offer significant tactical or operational 
advantages in the near future, and their use will not necessarily make operations easier 
or less destructive; they may merely make the infliction of pain more compatible with 
liberal consciences" (Hills 2004, 213). 
The sombre message of Hills' analysis is that urban operations are intractable. This is 
because urban warfare is inherently brutal, and presents a range of analytic, strategic, 
and moral challenges to which current thinking seems to offer no solution. How, for 
example, can liberal nations come to terms with the fact that the most effective 
weapons (such as flamethrowers or their contemporary equivalents, thermobaric 
munitions) and tactics (such as levelling buildings with artillery or bombs in order to 
neutralise snipers) for urban combat run contrary to central liberal moral 
commitments? How will liberal nations cope with the reality that urban operations 
seem inescapably to involve high casualty levels? Hills' final thoughts are worth 
quoting at length: 
Ultimately, urban operations deserve attention because they are the most 
complex of all military operations and because they engage with key emergent 
issues and trends. Urban operations represent a hard security challenge while 
offering a powerful conceptual means for generating new insights into military 
operations in an urbanising world. They are a reminder that, when searching 
for the global roles and meaningful purposes that 'new war' articulates, we run 
the risk of paying insufficient attention to the unchanging nature of military 
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force. Integrating the various aspects of urban operations is therefore 
important. For just as the Cold War placed security studies at the centre of the 
intellectual and political challenges confronting the West, so urbanisation and 
demographic change may meant that urban operations represent a critical issue 
in the twenty-first century. The West's ability to address these challenges 
effectively will depend to a large extent on the skill with which it understands 
the phenomenon of military operations within the broader context of security. 
(Hills 2004, 260) 
Implications 
What is clear from both Biddle and Hills is that, for all the talk of radical 
transformation in contemporary warfare, future operations are far more likely to 
reflect past lessons learned than anything revolutionary. In this section of this chapter 
I wish to consider the implications of the analyses put forward by Biddle and Hills for 
the private military industry. 
There is no revolution 
The first point here, and it bears repeating, is that while technology will no doubt 
continue to increase the lethality of the emerging battlespace, it does not and will not 
(at least in the foreseeable future) change the essential nature of military operations. It 
is simply not true that the so-called 'Afghan Model' - in which a handful of special 
operations soldiers backed by sophisticated airpower and artillery support take on and 
defeat traditional forces - will replace the need for traditional 'boots on the ground' 
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operations. The reality is that it still requires infantry to take and hold ground, and 
this places considerable manpower demands on military forces. As Hills' analysis 
emphasises, this is particularly so for operations on urban terrain, which will in all 
likelihood be the most common environment for conflict in the 21st century. In the 
post Cold War era of discretionary operations in which large standing armies seem to 
most policymakers to be an unnecessary expense, it is increasingly likely that it will 
be necessary to turn to other sources - including private military companies - to make 
up the shortfall in trained military personnel. 
Professionalism is crucial 
Biddle's 'modern system' will continue to be the crucial factor in battlefield success. 
The implication of this is that the skills of the highly trained professional soldier will 
continue to be in demand. Gone are the days of Napoleon's levee en mass in which 
the sheer weight of a huge conscript army could tip the scales in battle. We need only 
remember the fate of the numerically superior conscript forces of Argentina in the 
Falklands/Malvinas war, or that of the vast conscript forces of the Iraqi regime in 
1991. Biddle's analysis is uncompromisingly clear - it is force employment, rather 
than simple force of numbers that counts on the battlefield. Biddle's analysis also 
makes it very clear, however, that developing and maintaining military forces capable 
of operating the modern system is both difficult and expensive. For many states, 
particularly in the developing world but also in an increasingly budget-conscious 
developed world, the cost of having an in-house modern-system capable military will 
See Stephen Biddle's excellent analysis of the 'Afghan Model' in his Afghanistan and the Future of 
Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War 
College, 2002). Available as a free download at 
http:'/www strategicstudiesinstitute,army mil/pubs/display.ciro?PubU> 109. Accessed 18 July 2007. 
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be adjudged as being too high. While some of this capability may be supplied by 
allies and regional organisations, the off-the-shelf and on demand professional 
capability offered by private military companies staffed by highly-trained former 
members of the world's elite armed forces will become an increasingly attractive 
alternative. 
Warfare will be bloody and difficult 
Biddle's analysis consciously focuses on conventional operations outside of urban 
areas, and takes as its basis a conventional view of military victory. As mentioned 
above this is defined in terms of military 'capability', which Biddle describes as 
follows: "offensive military capability [is] the capacity to destroy the largest possible 
defensive force over the largest possible territory for the smallest attacker casualties 
in the least time; defensive military capability is conversely the ability to preserve the 
largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory with the greatest 
attacker casualties for the longest time" (Biddle 2004, 6). This broadly Clausewitzean 
view of victory remains relevant for conventional conflicts like the 1991 Iraq war, 
and in such conflicts it remains possible for vastly superior forces like those of the US 
military to inflict massive casualties on enemy forces while keeping its own casualties 
to a minimum. Unfortunately, as Hills' analysis makes clear, Biddle's approach to 
military victory cannot be applied easily to asymmetrical urban conflict. As US forces 
in Iraq have discovered to their detriment, it is almost impossible to arrange a 
'decisive battle' in this kind of conflict, and even the most capable and 
technologically advanced forces must still accept a significant and steady stream of 
casualties. As I will discuss below, social conditions in the developed world make this 
28 Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe this in terms of the standard US military reading of 
Clausewitz. See Andreas Herberg Rothe's very interesting analysis of Clausewitz in his Clausewitz's 
Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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sort of casualty rate increasingly unpalatable. It is increasingly likely, therefore, that 
policymakers seeking to project force beyond the borders of their nations will turn to 
proxy forces as a way to minimise risk. Such forces are increasingly likely to include 
highly professional and capable forces supplied by private military companies. It 
takes little imagination, for example, to see this approach suggested 'between the 
lines' in the main conclusions of Metz and Millen's 2003 report for the Strategic 
Studies Institute of the US Army War College entitled Future War/Future 
Battlespace. The report singles out two main conclusions: 
first, the marked decline of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the rise of 
ambiguous, protracted, indecisive conflict in complex environments; second, 
because the collective international community will seek to harness American 
military hegemony, the United States should adopt a broad spectrum strategy 
based on partnership and shared risks for long-term national interests. (Metz 
and Millen 2003, vii) 
1.2. Non-Material Factors29 
The latest catchphrase to enter the English language as a result of military conflict is 
the term 'asymmetrical warfare'. At its broadest, asymmetrical warfare is simply any 
conflict in which there is a significant qualitative mismatch between opponents in 
This section draws on my article 'Moral Asymmetry in Contemporary Warfare' Theoria, April 
2005, 106, pp 128-140. 
30 By which term I mean not differing degrees of quality, but rather differences in kind. Thus, simply 
having much better tanks than one's opponents (for example) would not qualify the conflict as 
asymmetrical. In this respect the 'first' Gulf War probably does not qualify as an asymmetrical conflict, 
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any or all of the following: manpower, firepower, technology and tactics. While the 
phrase is new, the concept is not. Asymmetrical warfare has been going on for about 
as long as humans have fought each other in organized ways. In the South African 
context, for example, one need only think of the devastating attacks by King Shaka's 
highly-organized regiments (equipped as they were with revolutionary weaponry like 
the short stabbing spear or assegai), against the various tribes and groups that got in 
the way of Shaka's expansionist goals. Asymmetry was also an essential component 
in the successes of the rifle, canon and Gatling-gun equipped colonial armies who 
subdued the tribesmen of Africa and elsewhere. In the more recent past the ANC's 
low-tech guerrilla campaign against the conventional might of the apartheid regime is 
yet another example. There are of course complexities here, and asymmetries are not 
all of the same ilk, nor do they remain fixed, and certainly it is sometimes difficult to 
tell whether a conflict can properly be defined as asymmetrical. Nonetheless the 
general concept is easily recognizable. 
The conflict that has brought the phrase into the public sphere is the US-led 'War on 
Terror', and in particular the post 9/11 US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
the latter region, a very clear and obvious difference can be seen between Gulf wars I 
and II. In the 1991 war the US-led coalition faced the world's fourth largest 
conventional army arrayed along a clear battlefront, the border between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. Once the land-war started, in less than 89 hours the numerically inferior 
but technologically superior coalition forces plunged Saddam's army's world ranking 
from fourth down to somewhere in the twenties. And despite over ten intervening 
despite the one-sidedness of the campaign and the clear technological advantage of the coalition forces 
over the Iraqi army. 
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years, the army that the US-led coalition forces took on more recently in their march 
to Baghdad had not improved much on their conventional forces seeding. 
So, instead of facing up to US and British tanks, artillery and airpower on the open 
battlefield, the Iraqi army, Republican Guard and related units attempted to transform 
themselves into fast-moving and difficult to identify guerrilla units, who chose as 
their terrain the major cities of their country. Despite this effort, Saddam's regime did 
not long survive the coalition onslaught, but this attempt by the Iraqi army to fight an 
asymmetrical war was not without its successes. Take, for example, the experience of 
the much-vaunted US Apache helicopter forces. On one occasion, on the night of 23-
24 March 2003, a force of 32 AH-64D 'Longbow' Apaches, arguably the most 
technologically advanced attack helicopters in the world, were dispatched on a 
textbook mission to interdict Iraqi forces in the town of Karbala, some 113km 
southwest of Baghdad. Using their advanced night-fighting abilities, the idea was to 
utilize their sophisticated long-range Hellfire missiles to destroy Iraqi mechanized 
units in the town, in order to ease the passage of advancing US ground forces. Instead, 
the Apaches found themselves engulfed by a hail of low-tech ground fire, which 
resulted in 31 of the 32 aircraft being damaged, some of them severely. One Apache 
was lost when it was forced to crash-land on its return to base, while another went 
T 1 
down in enemy territory, resulting in its crew being captured. 
Despite successes like these, the attempt by the Iraqi army to defeat the US and UK 
forces by asymmetrical warfare failed, and the invading forces achieved all of their 
military goals with relatively few losses. It is, however, in the time since the fall of 
3' http:.7www.cnn coin'SPEC! ALS/2003/rraq/war.tracker/03.24 index.html. See also the excellent 
account in Gordon and Trainor 2006, Chapter 14. 
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Baghdad that asymmetrical warfare has truly come to the fore. US and allied forces 
have sustained significantly more casualties since the end of the 'proper' war than 
they suffered during it. The almost daily attacks that the occupying forces are facing 
from lightly armed insurgents who then melt back into the general populace are taxing 
the resources and morale of the world's military superpower more than Saddam's 
army ever could. The technological advantages that the US armed forces in particular 
have are rendered largely ineffectual in the face of this kind of low-intensity conflict. 
In such situations what good, for example, is the M1A2 Abrams tank's much vaunted 
ability to achieve a near 100% kill rate against enemy armour at ranges of up to 
4000m at night and while on the move? 
The current situation in Iraq, then, most certainly warrants the 'asymmetrical warfare' 
label. The occupying forces doubtless far outnumber those they are fighting. Despite 
the increasing sophistication of insurgent improvised explosive devices (IED's), the 
weaponry being employed by the Iraqi resistance remains virtually Stone Age in 
comparison to the technological marvels available to the occupiers. And the guerrilla 
tactics being employed by the coalition's opponents bear little resemblance to the 
mechanized warfare that the US and allied forces are primarily trained for. All of this 
is well documented and has been much discussed in the media. There is, however, one 
other asymmetry between the combatants that has been far less frequently commented 
upon, and it strikes me as possibly the most important. 
The asymmetry referred to here is a moral one. It is not, however, the asymmetry 
between good and evil. The asymmetry referred to involves instead, the nature of the 
moral understanding of the opposing parties. Ostensibly, at least, both sides believe 
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themselves to be fighting for good. What differs is how 'fighting for good' is 
understood. 
On the one hand, the commanders and soldiers of the US and other forces currently 
occupying Afghanistan and Iraq are held to a moral code that coheres, for the most 
part, to the traditional Just War doctrine of jus in hello. For example there is the rule 
that occupying forces must respect the human rights of the Iraqi people. Military 
operations must be conducted in such a way as to minimize what is clinically called 
'collateral damage': the death of civilians and the destruction of non-military 
property. Rules of engagement forbid soldiers to fire on civilians unless they present a 
clear threat. And so the list continues. Of course the presence of this code is no 
guarantee that it will be followed, as recent humiliations of Iraqi prisoners evince. 
Nonetheless, the condemnation of such actions directed at those responsible provides 
further evidence of its existence. 
On the other hand, those opposing the US and its allies, whether it be the Taliban, Al-
Qaeda, or the seemingly vast array of other groups that are responsible for the various 
attacks in Iraq, show little commitment to these same ideals. While there may well be 
some sorts of moral restraints on how these groups conduct their campaigns (the 
diversity and secrecy of the organizations involved make this difficult to ascertain), 
those restraints, if they exist, are manifestly not the same as those that guide the 
official conduct of the coalition forces. Torture, the killing of innocent bystanders, 
attacks on civilian targets, hostage-taking and executions, manipulating the faithful 
into carrying out suicide bombings, and so on, are not only commonplace but appear 
to be among the main strategies being employed by the opposing forces. 
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This moral asymmetry strongly favours the opponents of the US and its allies. For 
where Western forces are increasingly restricted in their operations by the restraints 
imposed on them by squeamish Western standards of decency, their opponents are 
free to participate in whatever 'evils' they deem effective in undermining their 
opponents. In an article in Time magazine, columnist Joe Klein reminds us that when 
Julius Caesar faced 'pacification problems' after his conquest of Gaul, he simply had 
his troops cut off the hands of the first batch of rebels to be captured, and ordered 
them to be sent through Gaul as a warning to others. As Klein points out, however, 
the US has 'a less vivid set of pacification options than Caesar did.'32 Western notions 
of human rights, justice, and the like have seen to that. 
The biggest question facing developed world forces is not that of whether or not they 
are capable of adjusting weapons and tactics to more effectively meet the attacks of 
asymmetrical opponents. More fundamental is the question of whether or not the 
moral asymmetry between the combatants makes an ultimately effective response 
even possible. And if it is, indeed possible, what principles should guide combat 
troops under these conditions? Will effective and (from the Western point of view) 
morally acceptable means be found by which to prosecute the 'War on Terror' and 
other asymmetrical conflicts? Or will developed world armed forces be forced to 
(officially) fight dirty too? This latter possibility ought not to be too quickly 
discounted. A recent example of such thinking comes from Col. John B. Alexander, 
US Army (retired) in a recent book called Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, 
Strategies, and Concepts for the Post-9/11 World. Among the 'advanced strategies' 
32 'Who is Losing Iraq?' Time August 31st 2003 (electronic version, 
hup /'"vvww time.com/time/coluniTUSit'klein/article 0,9565,480230.00.html, accessed 7 July 2004) 
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proposed by Alexander is the assassination of all known family members of suicide 
bombers, on the grounds that one of the things that encourages suicide bombers in 
taking on their missions is the assurance that their families will be well cared for 
(Alexander 2003, 201). That this opinion is not necessarily that of a lunatic fringe is 
reflected by the fact that, among other things, Alexander is a consultant to the 
commander-in-chief of US Special Operations. 
While Western government officials seem to have paid little attention to this problem 
of moral asymmetry, it has not gone unnoticed in the academic world. In this part of 
this chapter I will discuss three arguments that seem to me to be a representative 
selection of contemporary approaches, namely those put forward by Roger Barnett, 
Christopher Coker and Gwyn Prins. 
Asymmetrical Warfare - Barnett 
It is Barnett who most straightforwardly deals with asymmetrical warfare, which he 
succinctly defines as "those actions that an adversary can exercise that you either 
cannot or will not" (Barnett 2003, 15). Barnett's analysis is a clear, concise and no-
nonsense account of the restrictions in place on the use of force by the US armed 
forces, the 'cannot' and 'will not' that leads to asymmetry as he defines it. He dwells 
little on the position of the actual and potential opposition faced by the US, instead he 
primarily points the reader's attention to a book entitled Unrestricted Warfare written 
by two colonels of the People's Republic of China's People's Liberation Amy, and 
published in 1999. Barnett quotes from that work as follows: 
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When a nation state or national armed force, (which adheres to certain rules 
and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off with one of 
these types of organizations [the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; and ... terrorist 
groups like Osama bin Laden's] (which never observe any rules and which are 
not afraid to fight an unlimited war using unlimited means), it will often prove 
very difficult for the nation state or national armed force to gain the upper 
hand, (quoted in Barnett 2003,1) 
Little more than this needs to be said, and the few other cases of adversaries or 
potential adversaries singled out by Barnett are judiciously chosen and together 
constitute a very convincing case. Barnett puts more effort into accounting for the 
fourfold restrictions on the use of force by the US.33 The operational constraints 
singled out by Barnett are the US's commitment to the 'strategic defensive'; the 
restriction of ways, means and risks to reflect limited ends; and reservations about the 
effects of the use of force. Organizational constraints are those that arise out of the 
organization of the US government and the various international treaties and 
commitments that bind it. Legal restraints involve the various codifications of Xhejus 
ad bellum and the jus in bello that exist in international treaties, protocols, 
conventions, opinions of international courts and tribunals and the like. Finally, the 
central and obvious moral constraint that Barnett focuses on is the moral presumption 
against the use of force: "It underlies the other sources of constraint — operational, 
organizational, and legal — but can be separated from them because it goes beyond 
them" (Barnett 2003, 83). In Barnett's view, the effects that these constraints have 
are, in a nutshell, that unless addressed they at best leave the US an impotent player 
3 While Barnett focuses almost entirely on the situation of the US, the points he makes generally apply 
just as appropriately to her allies, and indeed, to the developed world in general. 
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on the world stage, and at worst they open the gates of civilization to the barbarian 
hordes beyond. 
Barnett's solution? While admitting that the complex effects of the constraints he sets 
out make simple solutions unlikely, he suggests that remedies may be discovered 
within a mix of decisive and strong leadership, greater commitment to 
consequentialist thinking in decision-making regarding the use of force and the nature 
of the force used (including a willingness to "reach outside international law and 
organizations for remedies" (Barnett 2003, 135)), and a clearly thought through and 
realistic set of guidelines for the use of force in a complex set of contexts. This will 
have the consequence, Barnett argues, of helping to "illuminate the constraints on the 
use of force and to reduce their effects" (Barnett 2003, 146). Importantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, among the strategic force options that Barnett thinks could 
emerge from the implementation of this cluster of remedies are the use by the United 
States of 'mercenary forces'. He also recommends the sanctioned use of assassination 
as a means to bring a conflict to termination. In general, it is clear that Barnett is 
frustrated and impatient with many of the constraints he delineates, and that he is 
convinced that some clear thinking on this issue will make it clear that "many of the 
constraints are strictly fair weather phenomena: When the going gets tough, the 
constraints get going" (Barnett 2003, 147).34 
For all his thoroughness, Barnett offers no analysis of the underlying causes of the 
moral constraints he delineates (it is clear that, though differently defined, all of the 
34 These are the 'last words' of Barnett's book. It is interesting to note that this is very similar in tone to 
the ending of Col John Alexander's book Winning the War (quoted above). Alexander closes off his 
book with these sentences: "We Americans are a magnanimous poeple [sic] who would prefer to be 
loved rather than feared. Unfortunately, there are others who respect only those they fear. So be it." 
(Alexander 2003, 273) 
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constraints he sets out are broadly moral in nature). In fact, he is very explicit about 
this, claiming that "the sources of such moral constraints — whether they arise from 
basic Judeo-Christian teachings, from the Enlightenment, or from other sources --
need not detain this analysis. It suffices here to note their existence and to seek to 
appreciate their depth and breadth" (Barnett 2003, 83). Certainly, the lack of such an 
analysis in no way undermines the quality of the account Barnett gives. Nonetheless, 
the solutions he proposes are at least in part solutions involving an adjustment to the 
moral stance taken by the US (and, by proxy, her allies), and, as we shall see below, it 
is an open question whether such an adjustment is indeed possible for developed 
world nations given the prevailing moral climate. 
Humane Warfare - Coker 
Christopher Coker's Humane Warfare is explicitly focused on the underlying cultural 
and philosophical trends that have led to contemporary views of force and its 
deployment. Coker's book is reminiscent in approach (though much shorter and 
focused on a narrower question) to Charles Taylor's magisterial Sources of the Self 
(1989), in that it sets out to track the changes in western consciousness that have led 
to the 'humanising' of war: war in which cruelty and hatred are renounced and 
courage is redundant, war which is fought by humane soldiers rather than warriors 
and which is justified exclusively on humanitarian grounds. Like Taylor's book, 
Humane Warfare traces shifting conceptualizations of war, its nature, and its 
justification by focusing on key Western thinkers who best encapsulate the 
understanding of their time. Machiavelli, Hegel and Nietzsche are prominent, as are 
contemporary thinkers like Judith Shklar, Ulrich Beck and, most notably, Richard 
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Rorty. Also addressed along the way (another similarity with Taylor's approach) are a 
selection of significant and influential literary works that further reflect the changes 
Coker is delineating, books like Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's 
Slaughterhouse 5. 
Coker offers a disclaimer for his work in the introduction to the book, describing it as 
exploratory rather than explanatory, and limiting its scope to the "reflections, 
impressions and objections that the phenomenon [of humane warfare] has provoked in 
me" (Coker 2001, 6). Laudable as this modesty is, it is in large part unwarranted. 
While no work of this kind can ever be considered to be complete or definitive, Coker 
nonetheless presents a very convincing and articulate case for his conclusion. For all 
its accuracy, however, that conclusion is an uncomfortable one. Coker depicts the 
contemporary West as faced with a seemingly irresolvable paradox. On the one hand, 
the rise and rise of respect for individual human rights provides impetus for Western 
military intervention in situations where those rights are severely trampled. Unique to 
our 'post-Westphalian' era is the conviction that humanitarianism trumps over state 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the loss of faith in universal truth and the consequent 
'ironic' approach to war has robbed the West of the courage of that conviction. No 
longer can we expect, or even allow, soldiers to lay down their lives in the service of 
some ideal. Furthermore, it is also becoming less and less palatable to kill the enemy. 
This paradox is not entirely disabling. Coker points to the rise of 'non-lethal weapons' 
and the increasing automation of the battlefield as ways that are being explored to 
circumvent the paradox. These measures, however, are not viewed by Coker as 
sufficient to truly address the problem faced by the West with respect to the 
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deployment of military force. His conclusions are sombre. We are likely, he argues, to 
"pay a high price for continuing to find war 'ironic'" (Coker 2001, 144). Unlike 
Barnett he believes that the asymmetry resulting from this paradox is unlikely to 
result in the fall of the West to the 'barbarians' at the gate ("The West remains more 
than powerful enough to fight its own corner" (Coker 2001, 144)), Coker thinks that 
there remains a significant problem. "Instead of intervening on behalf of others [the 
West] may prefer to lock itself into its own world, to quarantine itself off from the 
infection of the outside world, like Caliban in his cell, unwilling to face Prospero's 
phantoms ... we may abandon much of the world to the forces of barbarism" (Coker 
2001,144-145). 
The Heart of War - Prins 
Somewhat more upbeat is Gwyn Prins. For the purposes of this thesis what is of 
primary interest in Prins' work is the theoretical underpinning of the response he 
pursues to the moral difficulties inherent in engaging in contemporary armed conflict. 
Prins recognizes and takes seriously the points made by the doomsayers who argue 
that the moral and political resources are simply not available to make humanitarian 
interventions a meaningful reality.35 Nonetheless he believes that while intervention is 
difficult and only likely to occur in extreme cases such as cases of genocide, such 
Interestingly, Prins is not convinced that terrorism presents the threat that many (including the US 
government) take it to. While he in no way attempts to downplay the horror and effects of events like 
the 9/11 attacks, he points out that Westerners remain statistically very unlikely to die or be injured as a 
result of war or terrorism (see Prins 2002, 63 ff). Against the much-feared future scenario of terrorist 
groups deploying weapons of mass destruction, he argues that if the well financed, technologically 
advanced and highly organised Aum Shinrikyo cult were unable to successfully carry out a WMD 
attack (despite pouring an enormous amount of energy and resources into chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons programmes) it is highly unlikely that other terrorist groups will succeed either. The 
biggest challenge he sees for the West, therefore, is that of humanitarian intervention. In this he is in 
agreement with Christopher Coker who, as I mentioned above, thinks that the West has more than 
enough resources to 'fight its corner', but that the real worry is whether or not the West is able to 
intervene in the 'poor on poor' uncivil wars of the rest of the world. 
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intervention is indeed possible. For Prins, the principles that he believes can provide 
the impetus for humanitarian intervention are Kantian in nature. Kant's Perpetual 
Peace, with its notion that hospitality is the key to genuine, self-sustaining peace, is 
what pilots Prins' revised view of strategic studies away from neo-realism. He 
contends that "What makes Kant's way of thinking so useful for our early-twenty-
first-century task is that he offers a way of prescribing and guiding practical actions 
where there is no unitary Leviathan, or where those suffering with unsatisfied or 
abused human rights, like the poor, hungry and powerless, have no other option than 
to rely upon the inner sense of duty propelled (in Kant's terms) by the Categorical 
Imperative within the rich and powerful, to quicken their will to act" (Prins 2002, 
121). Indeed, Prins views the categorical imperative as the ground-breaking 
consideration introduced into international common law by Tony Blair in his 
justification of NATO intervention in Kosovo, and as implicit in the introduction by 
Kofi Annan of the idea of individual sovereignty as a notion that must be considered 
by the UN to carry as much weight as the sovereignty of nations. It is this Kant-
inspired thinking that convinces Prins that meaningful interventions (what he calls 
'strategic raiding') in response to extreme humanitarian crises are both feasible and 
justifiable for the UN and the countries of the developed world. Prins argues that the 
urgency and stringency of humanitarian crises allow for operations that fall outside of 
UN sanctioned-activity, as long as those operations carry the broad support of the 
international community. He cites the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the British 
intervention in Sierra Leone as examples (see Prins 2002, Ch 5). 
Implications 
36 'Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone 
else's territory.' (Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, quoted in Prins 2002, 120) 
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The positions considered above present, as we have seen, a range of differing 
conclusions. Barnett worries that, unless strong measures are taken, asymmetrical 
warfare may even result in the demise of the West. Coker dismisses this possibility, 
but sees little hope that the West will be able to sustain meaningful interventions in 
support of humanity in the non-Western world. Prins also rejects Barnett's concern, 
but differs with Coker in his conviction that, though difficult, humanitarian 
intervention against the perpetrators of 'uncivil' wars is morally and politically 
possible if launched from a platform of Kant's categorical imperative. Which of these 
predictions seems most likely? My own view is closest to, though not exactly the 
same as, Barnett's. Unlike Coker and Prins I am more cautious about believing that 
the developed World's asymmetrical opponents do not represent a real threat to the 
very existence of liberal democracy. I am not convinced by Prins' argument about the 
inability of terrorist groups to make use of weapons of mass destruction. Although, as 
Prins points out, the Aum Shinrikyo cult failed in their pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
programme (which included the purchase of a large sheep station in Australia's 
outback, where they intended to mine uranium (Prins 2002, 81)), it seems clear that 
the production of a so-called 'dirty bomb' is well within the technological grasp of 
many terrorist groups, and that the necessary radioactive material would not be all that 
difficult to acquire. While the use of such weapons would not defeat the armed forces 
available to the West, the impact of their deployment might well be of sufficient scale 
that liberal democracies could be transformed into right-wing totalitarian regimes. A 
similar point forms the basis of my disagreement with Coker. Though he is (rightly) 
confident that the West is militarily powerful enough to fight its own corner, the 
37 A 'dirty bomb' is one which uses conventional explosives for its explosive effect, but which has 
radioactive material packed around the conventional core. Such a bomb has the potential to result in 
massive long-term casualties and could turn a major city into a radioactive wasteland for centuries. 
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question is whether the moral will to fight will be in place in sufficient time to protect 
the liberal democratic ideal, and indeed whether that will, when it does arise, might 
not itself undermine liberal democracy. 
I am also less confident than Prins that the categorical imperative carries sufficient 
force in our post-modern world to sustain humanitarian interventions by the armed 
forces of the developed world. I do not for a moment doubt the motivating force of 
this Kantian principle, but rather its ongoing power. The ironism that Coker points to 
is not nihilism, it is not that those affected by it do not feel the push of moral 
imperatives, rather it is that the lack of belief in moral absolutes (which, it must be 
remembered, is what underlies the categorical imperative) means that such 
imperatives must be viewed with detachment. Wholehearted commitment is no longer 
truly possible. Prins points out that the test that Blair famously set up in his Kosovo 
speeches for when humanitarian intervention may be considered justifiable includes 
providing a positive answer to the question "are we prepared for the long haul?" 
(Prins 2002, 150) This is exactly what the paradox that Coker so adeptly brings to 
light calls into question. 
More positively, though, it seems to me that some of the ways of avoiding Coker's 
paradox gestured at by Coker and Barnett offer more hope than either of them seem to 
believe is possible. Coker is right that cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (like 
the highly successful Predator UAV), and other such 'war robots' probably do not 
represent a complete answer to the partial paralysis induced by an ironic view of war. 
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At the end of the day, Kosovo notwithstanding, wars are only won by boots on the 
ground. However, combine these technological advances with Barnett's reluctant 
suggestion of the mandated use of 'mercenary forces' and a genuinely possible 
response emerges. While he doesn't make it explicit, it seems clear that Barnett is 
referring to private military companies when he makes use of the term 'mercenary' 
here. Certainly, the businesslike approach to war overtly taken by private military 
companies fits well with the emotionally neutral view of war (war without cruelty, 
war without hatred, and so on) that Coker describes so well in his book. As Herfried 
Miinkler points out "In the history of political thought, this lack of political ties to the 
contractor has again and again been viewed as the crucial defect of the mercenary 
system. In modern 'post-heroic' societies with a high degree of political 
responsiveness, however, this suddenly turns out to be a major point in its favour. 
Mercenaries, unlike professional soldiers or conscripts originating in the national 
electorate, have no possibility of eliciting a political response in the event of high-risk 
and high-loss operations" (Miinkler 2005, 134). 
Given the general agreement among the authors discussed above, that the social and 
moral conditions prevalent in the developed world are such as to significantly restrict 
the likelihood of the deployment of national military forces on discretionary 
operations like humanitarian interventions, there seems a far greater likelihood that 
the general trend towards such operations will be conducted via proxy forces, 
including and perhaps primarily forces supplied by private military companies. 
Kosovo is often pointed to as a clear case of the triumph of air power. However, as Stephen Biddle 
has pointed out to me (in conversation), the tide only turned in this conflict when a real threat of 
ground forces was brought to bear. 
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Conclusion 
I began this chapter by considering the material conditions most likely to apply to the 
battlespace of the 21st Century. Convincing analyses presented by Biddle and Hills 
show that while technology will undoubtedly continue to enhance the lethality of 
future weapons systems, these technological advances will not change the essential 
nature of armed conflict. Future battlefield success will still require well-trained and 
professional soldiers capable of using the 'modern system' of force employment. 
Private military companies, staffed primarily by former members of the world's elite 
military units, are a good source of such soldiers, particularly for countries without 
the necessary resources to develop and maintain 'modern system' capable forces of 
their own. Furthermore, the increasing likelihood of bloody, intractable and 
manpower-intensive urban conflicts increases the probability that states and regional 
organizations will turn to the private sector to provide additional forces and to 
undertake the more dangerous operations. 
In the second part of the chapter we saw that the push towards the deployment of 
private military companies caused by material factors in the future battlespace are 
multiplied by the non-material factors that seem likely to apply. In particular we saw 
that leading analysts identify two conflicting social and moral trends in the developed 
world: first, a rising recognition of, and concern for, the global importance of 
universal human rights; and second, an increasing intolerance for the casualties and 
other consequences that result from committing national military forces to distant 
conflicts in order to fight for those very same universal human rights. I argued that the 
private sector offers a means to address this paradox. The detached, 'socially 
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responsible corporation' and 'risk-management' approach presented by private 
military companies seems to fit well with the demands of both of these trends. 
It seems, then, that both the material and non-material conditions of the future 
battlespace favour the employment and deployment of private military forces like the 
one described in the introduction to this thesis. That being so, we must agree with 
Singer when he writes that "[a]s long as war exists, so will a demand for military 
expertise. [Private Military Companies] will resultantly benefit from any slack given 
by traditional sources of security. The overall history of public versus private military 
actors indicates that the privatized military industry will continue to play a significant 
and increasing role in international security in the next decades" (Singer 2003, 230). 
However, this on its own is not sufficient to show that private military companies 
ought to be employed - as philosophers are fond of pointing out, one cannot derive an 
ought from an is. In the next chapter I turn to the question of whether the use of 




Are Private Warriors Intrinsically Immoral? 
Of all the parts of the modern world it is unquestionably Africa that has been most 
affected by the practice of mercenarism. Indeed, most of our era's most infamous 
mercenaries - 'Mad' Mike Hoare, 'Black' Jack Schramm, and Bob Denard, to name a 
few - have plied their trade almost exclusively on African soil. The recent attempted 
toppling of the government of Equatorial Guinea by a group of mostly ex-South 
African Defence Force personnel has been a poignant reminder that mercenarism 
remains very much on the African agenda. An even more pervasive presence of the 
private warrior in African armed conflicts has been in his recent role as the employee 
of the private military company, the mercenary band's more sophisticated cousin.39 
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are good reasons to think that the nature of 
the future battlespace favours the employment of private military companies. Indeed, 
the employment of private military companies in places like Iraq and Afghanistan is 
unprecedented in modern times. Private military companies claim to be legitimate 
military service providers, and are for the first time challenging the view that the 
private provision of military force is intrinsically politically and ethically 
unacceptable. There is an increasingly vocal lobby that argues that the private 
provision of military services is simply a facet of a global trend, one not generally 
considered to be inherently ethically problematic, namely the move towards 
I use the male pronoun here because, with a few exceptions, warriors for hire are male. The 
exceptions to which I refer are almost entirely limited to the private military industry, where some 
former female soldiers and police officers have lucrative contracts interrogating and guarding women 
suspected of involvement in the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. 
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outsourcing what were traditionally government functions. For example, in a 
forthcoming paper Mervyn Frost argues that: 
the creation of private military companies does not offend or contradict the 
ethical values built into the most fundamental global institutions of our time, 
global civil society, and, the society of democratic states. We who hold 
civilian and citizenship rights are entitled to use our rights to create private 
companies offering services to other rights holders, provided that in doing so, 
we do not abuse the rights of our fellow rights holders. ... citizens in 
democracies might, with good reason, seek to privatize some functions 
normally carried out by public bodies. Furthermore, ... doing this need not 
offend our fundamental ethical commitments. Privatization is a public act, by 
a public authority, for the achievement of a public good. It involves the 
creation of an anarchical institution, for the achievement of public goods. The 
key ... is regulation by public bodies. (Frost forthcoming 2008) 
Advocates of Private military companies argue, further, that the private military 
industry can often perform vital military tasks - particularly in cases of humanitarian 
intervention - far more efficiently and in more cost-effective fashion than traditional 
UN or coalition forces. There now exists a growing body of scholarly literature 
dedicated to debating the question of what role, if any, the private military industry 
can legitimately have in the context of 'new' wars and humanitarian interventions. 
While the debate goes on, the industry is increasing its market share of conflict zones 
through involvement in such conflicts as the US led occupation of Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the recent AU intervention in Sudan. 
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• 
Despite the demand for legitimacy that is being made by the private military industry, 
the fact remains that in modern times soldiers-for-hire have been almost universally 
considered to be morally reprehensible. Surprisingly, however, there has been very 
little scholarly exploration of just what it is that so tarnishes the character of the 
private warrior. A recent search of the main database of philosophical work, The 
Philosophers' Index, revealed no publications on the topic of private military 
companies, and only two journal articles over the past decade on mercenaries in 
general. It is widely assumed that there is something deeply immoral about 
mercenarism, to the extent that 'mercenary' is unquestionably one of the more 
offensive descriptions we can give of a fellow human being. But what, exactly, is it 
about this kind activity that validates such moral censure? 
On closer inspection it becomes clear that there are really two main questions here. 
First, there is the question of whether or not mercenary activity is bad for the world -
if so, then clearly the warrior of good conscience ought not to become a mercenary. 
Second, there is the question of whether there is something intrinsically morally 
problematic about the warrior-for-hire, something that would make it wrong to 
become a mercenary even in a possible world in which the employment of 
mercenaries led to overwhelmingly good consequences for that world. Most of the 
ethics-related discussion of the private military industry has been around the first of 
these questions. A significant proportion of the consequentialist concern over the 
employment of private warriors relates to the question of the impact of such 
employment on civil-military relations. This concern is, of course, the central focus of 
this thesis, and is the subject of the next three chapters. But there is a prior question 
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that must be answered. For if the private warrior is intrinsically ethically 
objectionable, then the question of civil-military relations simply does not arise, for 
then it is inappropriate for democratically elected civil governments to have anything 
to do with private military companies other than outlawing them. 
An important restriction on the scope of this chapter must be acknowledged from the 
beginning. The political debate over whether military functions can be ethically 
outsourced to the private sector exists almost exclusively against the background of 
the broadly liberal political principles that underpin international law. In order to 
remain relevant to that debate, therefore, I shall restrict the scope of my analysis by 
taking that same broadly liberal background as given. Thus, there may well be good 
arguments for or against mercenarism that emerge from within the principles of 
certain religious viewpoints or philosophical traditions, but those arguments fall only 
within the scope of my discussion insofar as they overlap with the contemporary 
international debate on this topic. It should also be noted that most employees of 
private military companies do not like to be called mercenaries, and argue that it is not 
applicable to them. I do not, by using this term here, intend to imply that I believe the 
private military contractor to be synonymous with a mercenary. Instead, I take the 
idea of a mercenary as the worst case description of the private warrior, following the 
logic that if mercenaries turn out not to be intrinsically ethically objectionable, then 
this is almost certainly true of the private military contractor. 
In what follows I begin by drawing on the two papers on the ethics of mercenaries 
that were mentioned above, one authored by Anthony Coady (1992) and the other by 
Tony Lynch and A.J. Walsh (2000). Following these authors I begin by considering 
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the relevant arguments against mercenarism that were put forward by Niccolo 
Machiavelli. I will then turn to a consideration of the analogy that is supposed to hold 
between the mercenary and the prostitute, in order to assess whether or not this 
analogy stands up to close scrutiny. I conclude the chapter by analysing the argument 
expounded in a forthcoming work by Joseph Runzo to the effect that the private 
warrior lacks an essential qualification required of ethical battlefield actors, namely 
honour. 
Of course, one of the relevant issues in investigating just what is wrong with being a 
mercenary, is the definition of just what it is to be a mercenary. In his forthcoming 
paper 'What Are Mercenaries?' (forthcoming 2008) Uwe Steinhoff sets out to provide 
a satisfactory understanding of the term 'mercenary', firstly by presenting a definition 
of 'mercenary' as it applies to individual fighters, then by looking at the supposed 
differences between 'traditional' mercenary groups and modern PMSCs. Steinhoff 
considers what he describes as a typical definition, consonant with recent international 
agreements, given by Francoise Hampson, according to which "[mercenaries appear 
to have three essential characteristics. They are foreign, motivated principally by 
financial gain and use force, but not as regular members of the armed forces of a 
State" (quoted in Steinhoff forthcoming 2008). 
The characteristics which distinguish a mercenary from a regular soldier, on this sort 
of account, can be specified in terms of affiliation, motivation, and organizational 
incorporation. Though a mercenary, so understood, will not be morally admirable and 
may even be essentially morally disreputable - they are, after all, 'primarily 
motivated' by financial gain to engage in activities which might include killing their 
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fellow human beings - they are not by definition morally beyond the pale, since it is 
at least consistent with this definition that a mercenary accepts certain moral side 
constraints such that they will not, for example, fight in a clearly unjust war. Steinhoff 
points to a number of apparent counterexamples to Hampson's definition, where 
someone we would generally count as a mercenary lacks one or more of these 
distinguishing characteristics. Steinhoff offers his own definition, which has it that 
A mercenary is a person who is contracted to provide military services to 
groups other than his own (in terms of nation, ethnic group, class, etc.) and is 
ready to deliver this service even if this involves taking part in hostilities. Which 
groups are relevant depends on the nature of the conflict. (Steinhoff 
forthcoming 2008) 
Again, this does not make a mercenary morally beyond the pale by definition, and it is 
a narrower definition than that offered by Hampson, since it does not make motivation 
or organisational incorporation an essential feature of a mercenary. Steinhoff s 
definition is, to my knowledge, the best definition that is currently available, and is 
therefore the one that I will make use of in this chapter. 
As noted above, this definition is unusual in not defining mercenarism in terms of the 
motive for monetary gain, or something similar. Certainly, for most people, it is this 
that immediately springs to mind as the key characteristic of the mercenary warrior. 
But as Steinhoff points out: 
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If one looks at what are considered paradigmatic examples of mercenaries, for 
example the men of the Free companies or 'Mad' Mike Hoare's and Bob 
Denard's men in the Congo in the 1960s or 'Colonel' Callan in Angola in the 
70s, it becomes very clear that these men, or at least a very significant number 
of them, were not motivated principally by financial gain (which does not 
mean that they were not at all motivated by financial gain), but [rather] by 
adventurism or a love for war and fighting. (Steinhoff forthcoming 2008) 
Of course money is not irrelevant here, hence the idea of contract in Steinhoff s 
definition. As Steinhoff puts it: 
The financial motive, to be sure, should remain part of the definition of 
'mercenary'. Someone who fights for free or for relatively small pay in war 
after war is a pure adventurer or a war junkie, not a mercenary. On the other 
hand, the financial motive does not need to override or dominate all others, not 
even moral or ideological ones. Mercenaries who fight exclusively in wars that 
meet certain moral or ideological preconditions are not only conceivable but 
real.40 (Steinhoff forthcoming 2008) 
Before beginning our investigation proper, one final, and fairly important flag needs 
to be raised. It will not be possible here to analyze every single possible way the 
40 Steinhoff refers, by way of example, to "mercenaries like the famous Count von Rosen who are so 
selective about the wars they fight in that they can hardly be distinguished from ideologically 
motivated volunteers." Another relevant example would be the American pilots of the 'Flying Tigers', 
or the American Volunteer Airgroup, under the command of the legendary Captain Claire L. 
Chennault, who fought for China against Japan prior to US entry into the Second World War. Flying 
Tigers airmen were US Army and Navy pilots pilots who resigned their commissions in order to sign 
one-year contracts with the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company, to 'manufacture, repair and 
operate aircraft'. 
57 
mercenary might be considered to be morally problematic. Obviously, for example, if 
any kind of voluntary involvement in a situation of armed conflict were considered to 
be morally reprehensible, then this would be a good reason for not being a mercenary. 
It would, of course, also be a good reason not to volunteer to be a member of a 
national militia. That sort of issue is beyond what can be attempted in this thesis. The 
question that will be addressed here is what, if anything, negatively distinguishes the 
ethical status of the private warrior from that of an enlisted soldier, sailor or airman in 
the armed forces of some nation. 
-Machiavelli and the Mercenary Warrior 
Coady, Lynch and Walsh take as central the objections to mercenarism raised by 
Niccolo Machiavelli in his famous work, The Prince. Following Coady, Lynch and 
Walsh, it seems that these are effectively threefold: 
1. Mercenaries are not sufficiently bloodthirsty. 
2. Mercenaries cannot be trusted because of the temptations of political power. 
3. There exists some motive or motives appropriate to engaging in war that 
mercenaries necessarily lack, or else mercenaries are motivated by some factor that is 
inappropriate to engaging in war. 
The first of these points need not detain us long. For it is quite clear that, even if the 
empirically questionable claim that mercenaries lack the killing instinct necessary for 
war were true, this can hardly be considered a moral failing on the part of the private 
warrior. But perhaps the point is instead one about effectiveness - the claim that the 
58 
soldier for hire cannot be relied upon to do what is necessary in battle when the 
crunch comes, because he is too squeamish perhaps. Again, however, it is evident that 
this cannot be the moral failing we are looking for. For while we might cast moral 
aspersions on such a private warrior, those aspersions would be in the family of such 
terms as 'feeble', 'pathetic', or 'hopeless'. But these are quite clearly not the moral 
failings we are looking for in trying to discover just what is morally wrong with being 
a mercenary. Indeed, this very characteristic might just as easily be considered to be 
an ethically positive one. A more positive version of Machiavelli's claim, as Coady 
points out, is that the mercenary may be less prone to the passions that lead the 
national or ethnic zealot soldier to demonize the enemy and seek their total 
destruction. In this case, it must be the soldier who fights for his country or creed who 
is more deserving of our moral censure than the warrior-for-hire. 
The second point is even more easily dealt with. For it is quite clear that the 
temptation to grab power over a nation by force is at least as strong for national 
military forces as it is for mercenaries. In fact, it could well be argued that 
mercenaries are more reliable in this respect, given that they are usually foreign and 
therefore have less incentive to try to gain power over the nation that has contracted 
their services. Regardless of how true this latter empirical point is, it seems clear that 
there is nothing about being a mercenary that makes one more susceptible to being 
tempted by the lure of political power that is not also a factor for a member of a 
national military force or equivalent. 
The question of motives, however, is a weightier one, and requires more of our 
attention. The most common version of this objection is that there is something wrong 
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with fighting for money. As pointed out above, it is a central feature of the definition 
of a mercenary that he be contracted to provide military services - he is not simply a 
volunteer, and mercenarism has an inescapable commercial dimension to it. As Lynch 
and Walsh point out, however, the objection cannot simply be that money is in itself a 
morally questionable motivator for action. For while a case could perhaps be made for 
this, it would apply to such a wide range of human activities that it offers little help in 
discerning what singles out mercenarism as especially problematic. Perhaps, 
therefore, the problem is being motivated by money above all else. Lynch and Walsh 
helpfully suggest that we label such a person a lucrepath. Certainly we do find 
something deeply objectionable about someone for whom the accumulation of money 
is always the overriding consideration. By this thinking, as Lynch and Walsh put it, 
"Those criticizing mercenaries for taking blood money are then accusing them of 
being lucrepaths ... it is not that they do things for money, but that money is the sole 
or the dominant consideration in their practical deliberations" (Lynch and Walsh 
2000, 136). 
As Steinhoff s discussion makes clear, and as Lynch and Walsh themselves point out, 
there is no particular reason to think that mercenaries must be lucrepaths, or even that 
they usually are. Certainly there is no connection of a logical kind between being a 
lucrepath on the one hand and, on the other, a person who is "contracted to provide 
military services to groups other than his own" and who is "ready to deliver this 
service even if this involves taking part in hostilities." Steinhoff s discussion points 
out that there is good reason to doubt whether the pecuniary motive is the overriding 
one for most private warriors, indeed it is far more likely that, like the soldier of a 
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national militia, their motives are mixed. An additional point here4 is that there seems 
little reason to think that a soldier of a national military could not be a lucrepath 
(though, admittedly, not an especially successful one), and if this is so, then 
lucrepathology cannot be a useful way of distinguishing between the moral standing 
of all mercenaries, on the one hand, and the set of all members of national military 
forces on the other. 
Perhaps then, the question of appropriate motives is not that mercenaries are united by 
having a particular morally reprehensible motive, but rather that they lack a particular 
motive that is necessary for good moral standing when it comes to fighting and 
killing. What might such a motive be? Coady, as do Lynch and Walsh, identifies the 
main candidate here as that of just cause and right intention, as defined by Just War 
Theory.42 As Lynch and Walsh put it, "Ex hypothesi, killing in warfare is justifiable 
only when the soldier in question is motivated amongst other things by a just cause. 
Justifiable killing motives must not only be non-lucrepathic, but also, following 
Aquinas, must include just cause and right intention" (Lynch and Walsh 2000, 138). 
Immediately, however, Lynch and Walsh point out the obvious point that it is far from 
clear that this consideration is one that distinguishes the vile mercenary from the 
righteous citizen soldier. For it would be bizarre to claim that every member of a 
national military were so motivated, and equally doubtful that a private warrior could 
not be motivated in this way when entering into some or all of his contracts. As 
Coady points out, we can easily imagine a group of private warriors working together 
as 'Just Warriors Inc', who take remuneration for their services but who only offer 
those services in support of just causes. Indeed, many established private military 
41 Again one raised by Lynch and Walsh. 
42 This presumes that the idea of just cause or right intention applies to the individual soldier in a 
conflict, itself a contentious claim. 
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companies at least pay lip service to exactly this ideal, and there is no conceptual 
reason why private warriors of this kind could not exist.44 
There is one further version of the 'improper motives' objection to mercenaries that 
may yet provide a basis for appropriate moral censure, and here again it is the lack of 
a motivational element that is important. Here I am referring to the idea that the 
private warrior is not motivated to fight by a close association with the population on 
whose behalf he is deploying his military skills, what Lynch and Walsh refer to as 
"strong group identification" (Lynch and Walsh 2000, 140). The problem with the 
mercenary, by this interpretation, is that he is a foreigner, fighting for a group of 
people he cannot possibly care deeply about. The corollary of this is that it is a moral 
principle that one ought only to be willing to fight, kill and possibly die for people 
with whom one identifies in a close and personal way. But why should this be so? Of 
course it is not difficult to imagine an argument to the effect that there exists some 
sort of moral requirement on us to be willing to fight to defend the social group to 
which we, in some sense, belong, at least where the relevant conditions of a just war 
are met. But it does not follow from this that there are no other circumstances in 
which a warrior might legitimately practice his deadly trade. Take the soldiers of 
many nations who deployed to the Middle East in 1990 and 1991 to eject Saddam 
Hussein's forces from occupied Kuwait - were they guilty of some serious moral 
failing? And what of the United Nations peacekeepers who deploy to and sometimes 
fight in distant parts of the world, far from their home nations and societies? Quite 
43 See for example the website of Blackwater USA, which declares that the company offers its services 
'in support of security and peace, and freedom and democracy everywhere' 
(http://www.blackwatCTttsa.com/about/'), Historically, we can again think of the case of the Flying 
Tigers. Chennault himself seems to fall quite neatly into this category. 
44 Interestingly, Tobias Masterton and others have put forward the idea of a non-profit private military 
company that works exclusively for the United Nations. See 
liltP./.i^ww corpwatch.org'article.plip?Kl=8989. Accessed 19 July 07. 
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clearly there are circumstances in which a warrior may ethically be involved in an 
armed conflict even where his identification with the group for whose benefit he 
fights is no more specific than his identification with humanity in general. 
Furthermore, as we have already seen, there seems no reason to suppose that a soldier 
for hire might not, on principle, offer his services only to the group or groups with 
whom he strongly identifies. Unless this somehow means he is no longer a mercenary, 
then clearly this consideration is unhelpful in singling out the private warrior for 
moral condemnation. As Lynch and Walsh point out, "such considerations are 
external to the practice of mercenarism" (Lynch and Walsh 2000, 140). 
Before turning to an examination of the supposed analogy between prostitutes and 
mercenaries, there is one final possibility that remains to be considered under the 
'improper motives' rubric. And that is the thought that it is not any one of the above 
considerations that accounts for the badness of being a mercenary, but that it is 
instead the presence of all of these motivational factors. So perhaps what matters is 
holding a very strong (though not lucrepathic) pecuniary motive plus not being 
motivated by such ideals as just cause and right intention plus the lack of a strong 
identification with the group for whom the mercenary is employed to fight. Perhaps, 
but I don't think so. Firstly it is hard to see what it is about this combination of these 
factors that should lead us to a different conclusion to that reached by a consideration 
of each factor individually. And secondly, it is again not clear that this combination of 
factors offers sufficient ground to distinguish the mercenary from, say, a South 
African rifleman on African Union peacekeeping duties in the Sudan, who might 
easily display exactly these characteristics. And finally, it is evident once more that 
there is nothing about this bundle of characteristics that make them a necessary 
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feature of being a mercenary - as we have seen above, a private warrior could quite 
easily lack all of these characteristics and still fit the definition of a mercenary that I 
set out earlier in this paper. 
It seems therefore that an investigation into the reasons Machiavelli gives for counting 
the mercenary to be morally lacking, offers little support for the traditional vilification 
of the class of all private warriors. This is clear enough in Lynch and Walsh's paper, 
and were this all there is to be said, this chapter would offer nothing particularly new 
to the discussion. But there is at least one more angle of attack that is levelled at the 
private warrior that neither Lynch and Walsh nor Coady analyze closely, albeit a 
vague and unclear one, and that is that mercenaries are the 'whores of war'. What 
remains for this paper is to take a closer look at this analogy that is often supposed to 
hold between prostitutes and mercenaries. 
Whores of War? 
As I have said, an intriguing and yet under-analyzed analogy is often held to apply 
between those who contractually provide sexual services and those who contractually 
provide military services. Both forms of employment vie for the title of the oldest 
profession, and both are generally considered to be ethically problematic. But just 
what is it about mercenaries that supposedly makes them the 'whores of war'? A 
necessary starting point in assessing this is to consider what it is that is taken to be 
ethically troublesome about prostitution. 
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It's worth noting from the start that prostitution is no longer as universally vilified as 
it once was. In an interesting parallel with the rise of private military companies, 
prostitutes are increasingly re-labelling themselves as 'sex workers' and demanding 
recognition as legitimate members of economic society. Arguments in favour of this 
sort of view tend to be of the liberal contractarian brand advocated by Lars Ericsson, 
who argues that "If two adults voluntarily consent to an economic arrangement 
concerning sexual activity and this activity takes place in private, it seems plainly 
absurd to maintain that there is something intrinsically wrong with it" (Ericsson 1980, 
33). Such arguments are of little interest to us here, of course, for we are in search of 
reasons why prostitution might be considered to be bad. 
The response to Ericsson's paper by Carol Pateman sets up nicely one of the dominant 
lines of argument against prostitution, that which emerges from some quarters of 
feminism. As Pateman puts it, "The central feminist argument is that prostitution 
remains morally undesirable, no matter what reforms are made, because it is one of 
the most graphic examples of men's domination of women" (Pateman 1983, 561). 
Related to this are objections to prostitution on the grounds that it oppresses, 
endangers or harms the prostitute,45 or that prostitution results in a violation of one's 
autonomy (Anderson 2002). Again, however, this does not help us very much. For 
those fond of comparing mercenarism with prostitution are quite obviously not trying 
to argue that the mercenary is at risk of exploitation or some other abusive harm,46 
and that this is what is wrong with mercenarism! 
45 See for example the arguments put forward at hup: Hvvvw.prpstn.ijiionreseai'ch.com/ 
46 Though this may in fact be a very real risk. However this possible objection to mercenarism has not, 
to my knowledge, been explored in the scholarly literature. 
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What we are looking for here is some sort of objection to prostitution that would 
justify the sort of moral censure that lies behind such Biblical injunctions as the 
command to burn to death a priest's daughter if she turns to prostitution (Leviticus 
21:9). What is obvious is that this objection lies within the bounds of the claim that it 
is not appropriate to offer sex for money. But why is it not appropriate? I have already 
indirectly dismissed the idea that the problem here is an overriding desire for money 
(lucrepathology), for though this might well be considered to be morally problematic 
it is not specific enough to enable us to point the moral finger at the prostitute.47 So if 
it is not simply an overriding lust for money that is the problem, it must be that there 
is something about the nature of sexual relations that makes offering sex on a 
commercial basis immoral. Here, perhaps surprisingly, the Bible is of some help to us, 
for in it the nation of Israel is often compared with a prostitute when 'she' turns away 
from the God who has created, chosen, and rescued her (see for example Ezekiel 16). 
What seems to be at stake here is a particular relationship - prostitution is problematic 
because it involves a violation or breach of what is deemed to be the appropriate 
relationship. 
Whether this is a legitimate reason for the negative moral judgement on prostitution is 
not relevant here. The question for us is whether there is a successful analogy between 
mercenaries and prostitutes, where success is measured by the justification of 
apportioning moral censure on mercenaries. Asking this question requires us to 
heuristically take as given the most conservative view of prostitution, regardless of 
what we actually believe to be true of the morality of prostitution. The first thing we 
47 That this is one version of the 'mercenaries are prostitutes' objection is made clear by Lynch and 
Walsh when they write that "It is a commonplace that mercenaries are evil because they receive "blood 
money". Sometimes there is talk of "the whores of war". Such epithets point to a common moral 
criticism of mercenarism; namely, that mercenaries kill for money. The mercenary's killmg motives are 
morally inappropriate because they are in a determining sense financial." (Lunch and Walsh 2000, 135) 
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note here is that there is at first glance an apparent disanalogy between offering sex 
commercially on the one hand, and offering military services commercially on the 
other. In the case of prostitution, the act in question takes place between the two 
parties involved in the contractual relationship, presumably for mutual benefit. 
Mercenarism, on the other hand, involves one party contracting with another, for 
mutual benefit, to fight against some third party (presumably not for said third party's 
benefit!). This disanalogy does not, however, seem to be morally significant, and can 
be dissolved by replacing the term 'fighting' with something like 'defending' - then 
in both cases there is a contract for mutual benefit in which the first party pays the 
second to perform a desired service on his (or its) behalf. 
So then, what is it about commercial soldiering that is like offering sexual services for 
pecuniary reward? More specifically, what appropriate relationship is violated or 
disrupted by mercenarism? The main candidate in view here is that of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state. Just as it might be argued that the only morally 
appropriate relationship for the exercise of sexual relations is that between a husband 
and wife,48 so the implied argument here is that the only morally appropriate 
relationship for the exercise of martial skills is that between the citizen and the nation 
of his citizenship. Thus, just as prostitution and other forms of adultery or fornication 
are violations or disruptions of the morally appropriate sexual relationship, so 
mercenarism is a disruption of the morally appropriate martial relationship. 
If this is, indeed, the crux of the analogy between the prostitute and the mercenary, 
then, to state the obvious, the question we must here ponder is whether the 
48 Or (less conservatively) between two parties in a committed love relationship. 
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relationship between citizen and state is indeed the only appropriate one in service of 
which the warfighter can legitimately apply his deadly skills? It is generally accepted 
that killing is a morally serious matter, and it is this seriousness that, within civil 
society, seems to make it ethically appropriate for the state to hold the monopoly on 
violence, for this shifting of violence from the individual to the state is supposed to 
reduce the overall level and destructiveness of violence in society. For similar 
reasons, it is generally accepted that it is the organs of the state which bear 
responsibility for defending the state's citizens from outside attack.49 Does this, 
therefore mean that because states ought to defend their citizenry, citizens ought only 
to fight in the service of their states? The most coherent version of this thesis is based 
on the idea that, for individuals, the employment of violence is only ethically 
legitimate in cases of self-defence, and that the state's right to defend itself from 
attack derives in turn from the individual's right to self-defence. If this is true, the 
argument continues, then clearly the right to employ violence in defence of a state or 
other relevant group cannot extend to persons who are not members of that state or 
relevant group. 
The view that a state can derive its right to defend itself from the individual's right to 
self-defence is subjected to close scrutiny in a recent book by David Rodin. Rodin's 
rigorous analysis leads him to the following conclusion: 
The argument which draws a connection between personal self-defense and 
national-defense is at once beguilingly simple and intuitively appealing. It has 
informed moral and philosophical thinking on warfare since at least the time 
49 This generally accepted view is not, however, without its difficulties. David Rodin's book War and 
Self-Defense (2002) provides an excellent account of these difficulties. See also Baker 2006. 
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of the Cliristian Fathers and has had a powerful influence on the development 
of modern international law. But I have argued that the analogy cannot be 
philosophically sustained. National-defense cannot be reduced to a collective 
application of personal rights of self-defense, and it cannot be explained as a 
state-held right analogous to personal self-defense. (Rodin 2002, 162) 
Not surprisingly, Rodin's book has drawn a range of responses, but very few of these 
seem to undermine his conclusions. The one response to Rodin that seems to offer 
some hope of redeeming the state's right to defend itself from attack, one I explore 
elsewhere (Baker 2006), rests on the notion of human development as the central 
concept justifying the proportionate employment of armed force, both in defence of a 
state and for the purposes of humanitarian intervention. But if this is true, there is 
nothing particular about the state that gives it the authority to intervene using force in 
the interests of human development. 
Even if it were granted that the state's right to defend itself from attack derives from 
the individual's right to self-defence, it does not necessarily follow that this makes the 
private warrior a violator of the relationship between citizen and state. For it is 
questionable why the right to intervene in order to protect a citizen or group thereof 
should extend only to the state. Surely what matters is that said citizen or group of 
citizens is protected? In matters of life of death, it seems self-evident that a 
promiscuity of defenders is desirable. If we take the analogy with individual self-
defence seriously, then it must not be forgotten that there is a right for individuals to 
intervene to defend others as well as themselves, and there is nothing about this being 
a contractual arrangement that would undermine that right. Consider the case of Jane, 
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who finds that she has to walk through a bad neighbourhood at night. Jane is a 
taxpayer, and is therefore rightfully under the protection of the local police. However, 
the local police are not sufficiently effective to ensure her safety. Believing (rightly) 
that her chances of being attacked are high, Jane enters into a contractual arrangement 
with a bouncer at a nightclub she happens to pass, who agrees to protect her on her 
walk through the bad neighbourhood for an agreed fee. As it happens, Jane is 
attacked, and her companion does intervene to save her. Do we think that Jane's 
companion is in some sense unethical? No. True, we might have valued his actions 
more highly if he had offered his protection for free. But we do not somehow consider 
his actions to be unethical. This example reflects the dynamic that exists between 
state police and private security forces. It has not, to my knowledge, been argued that 
rent-a-cops are somehow deeply immoral because their occupation violates the 
citizen-state relationship with respect to the employment of force. Why then, should 
this suddenly become an issue when military force is involved? 
Even if the preceding argument is not accepted, this still doesn't necessarily leave the 
private warrior out in the cold. For why could a state not contractually employ private 
warriors who are its own citizens, as, for example, the US government does when it 
employs the services of Blackwater USA?50 Furthermore, it is not at all clear how the 
state-citizen relationship justifies the use of force in cases of humanitarian 
intervention and other 'peace operations', and yet it is increasingly recognized that in 
50 While the security clearances required for almost all Blackwater positions makes it virtually 
inevitable that its employees are US citizens, it's worth noting that citizenship is not a requirement for 
employment by the US military. 
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some cases such interventions are ethically required. Why then could private warriors 
not be employed for armed interventions of this kind?51 
The flip side of this issue (and it must be admitted that this is a consequentialist 
consideration, not one directly relevant to the virtue of the private warrior himself) is 
that it seems that a good argument could be made for the view that states ought 
always to prefer foreign mercenaries to citizen soldiers, for if the state has a duty to 
protect its citizens then that duty must surely extend also to those citizens who happen 
to make up the nation's armed forces. As Coady points out, Thomas More makes 
exactly this point in articulating the strategies of his wise Utopians.52 
My analysis thus far leads me to be inclined to concur with Lynch and Walsh when 
they write that: 
... many writers ... base their hostility to mercenarism on a moral analogy 
with prostitution. But if the strategy is a common one, nonetheless it is 
inadequate, depending on an extraordinary idealization of appropriate sexual 
and military relationships, and on a mistaken equation of the morality of 
intimacy with that of organized violence.5 (Lynch and Walsh 2000, 134) 
51 As it happens, this is precisely the market that the private military industry is working hardest to 
make its own. See for example the articles available on the website of the International Peace 
Operations Association (www.ipoaonline.org/home/) 
52 
Coady makes reference to Thomas More, Utopia, p.l 12. 
53 Lynch and Walsh seem poised at this point in their paper to go on to offer a detailed analysis of just 
why this analogy is inadequate. Oddly, however, they continue instead with this point: "The latter 
mistake is of particular importance, for too often the case against mercenarism rests on a failure to 
appreciate an insight contained in the liberal tradition. For it does not at all follow that encouraging 
virtuous motives in individuals ("righteousness") will contribute to the end of social justice, indeed on 
occasions the opposite may well be true. The attempt to maximise the virtue of the individual's 
participation in organised violence may have as a result more- and more bloody - violence than under a 
moral regime in which the virtue of such actions lies more generally in the merely pecuniary." (Lynch 
and Walsh 2000, 134) 
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Furthermore, as we saw, Machiavelli's arguments regarding the moral 
character of the mercenary are generally unconvincing. Of course this does not 
mean that some mercenaries have not nor will not do bad things - this is 
obviously not true. But the point is that there is nothing particular about their 
being mercenaries that makes them intrinsically bad. Our investigation thus far 
also does not show that, even if soldiers-for-hire are not necessarily bad in 
themselves, the exercise of this trade might not result in bad consequences for 
the world. I shall turn to an aspect of this question in the remaining chapters of 
this thesis. But if it turns out that there are ways of regulating the private 
military profession such that these private warriors may be employed in ways 
that are generally beneficial, then it seems to me there is then no further reason 
for policymakers to deny them a role in the management of armed conflict. 
Honour and the Private Warrior - Runzo 
Before concluding this analysis, there is one further line of argument that must be 
considered here. Joseph Runzo (forthcoming 2008), Professor of Philosophy and 
Religious Studies at Chapman University, puts forward the argument that the private 
warrior lacks a critical quality, 'honour', which disqualifies him from being ethically 
employed in combat. 
Runzo is at pains to show that the phenomenon of the private military company exists 
within the broad context of a shift in the focus of contemporary warfare towards 
discretionary operations directed against terrorism or in support of humanitarian 
objectives (and sometimes both). The ethics of war, exemplified by Just War Theory, 
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evolves along with the evolution of warfare itself, Runzo argues, and his chapter is an 
attempt to articulate a revised version of Just War Theory that accounts for the 
contemporary conflict environment. While certainly interesting, this aspect of 
Runzo's chapter is not of primary relevance to this thesis. What is relevant are what 
Runzo believes to be a number of significant problems with the employment of 
private military companies in contemporary conflicts. Together these factors lead him 
to conclude that the private warrior lacks the honour necessary for ethical engagement 
in armed conflict. 
Firstly, Runzo is troubled by the thought that "the personnel of a private military 
company neither systematically studies military law and Just War Theory nor operates 
under the purview of military law." While this has most certainly been true in the 
past, it is not clear this is really an intrinsic problem with the private warrior. Indeed, 
at time of writing, contractors in Iraq with contracts from the US military are coming 
to terms with the implications of new legislation that brings them under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice of the US armed forces.54 One wonders also to what extent it 
is true that the personnel of private military companies lack the necessary grasp of 
military law and Just War Theory. Given that private military companies tend to 
employ those with military or law enforcement backgrounds, it seems likely that there 
is in fact a fair degree of proficiency in these matters among private warriors. Added 
to this is the fact that the industry is increasingly taking self-regulatory steps to ensure 
that its members act ethically on the battlefield. For example the International Peace 
Operations Association, one of the largest associations of private military and security 
companies, has, in conjunction with American University, recently launched a 
54 http:/7vvwvv.m.ilitarv.coin/NewsContent/0.13319,121592JJ0.html. Accessed 19 July 2007. 
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training program aimed at 'field managers and independent contractors' which has 
stated goal of serving 
... as a mechanism by which the IPOA Code of Conduct and other standards 
can be operationalized by contractors active in conflict and post-conflict 
environments around the world. Participants will be trained in essential areas 
such as international humanitarian law, NGO/IO interaction, cultural, gender 
and religious sensitivities and learn how to operationalize field guidelines, 
increase productivity levels and to improve interaction with other actors.55 
The second problem with using private military companies in conflict zones that 
concerns Runzo is that, while they may provide some short term military advantage, 
they are not suited to the long-term endeavour of building peace, because "they are 
not in the business of reconciliation." Herfried Munkler argues the same point when 
he writes that, though private military companies might be of value for some tasks, "It 
is quite another question whether this kind of soldier is the best suited for operations 
designed to end a war and to bring peace; 'freelancers' can scarcely be expected to 
have the discipline and incorruptibility that are an essential condition for the success 
of such operations" (Munkler 2005, 134). This is of course a problem that is regularly 
pointed out about military forces in general, and it's hard to see here how this is a 
significant problem with private military companies in particular. In a later chapter in 
the same volume, Doug Brooks and Matan Chorev (forthcoming 2008) argue the 
contrary point that, because private military companies tend to employ a significant 
proportion of local personnel, this reduces their intrusiveness, which represents a 
55 htlpi/Vwv '̂W-americaii.edu/'si&^peacebuildmg/securit^/ti'ainJnainfo.htni. accessed 27 March 2007. 
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significant advantage for private military companies over regular military forces in 
building peace. 
In the remainder of his analysis Runzo, drawing on a wide range of religious and 
other sources, moves on to outline a global honour ethic for the contemporary warrior 
and an accordingly adjusted contemporary version of Just War Theory. Both of these, 
he argues, leave little room for the private warrior. The main reason Runzo gives for 
this conclusion is that, because of his pecuniary motive, the contractor is less likely to 
be free of the ropes of materialism (and so will face death with regret rather than 
resolution), more likely to dehumanise the enemy, and will have a greater propensity 
to use weapons to kill rather than to defend peace. Given that these points differ little 
from those considered and set aside earlier in the chapter, there seems little point in 
being detained by them here. 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter by outlining Uwe Steinhoff s well-conceived definition of the 
mercenary. With that in place I turned to a consideration of the main ethical 
objections to mercenarism that have been expressed in the relevant literature, 
primarily those expressed by Machiavelli and brought into recent discourse by Tony 
Coady. Following Lynch and Walsh I argued that none of these objections showed 
that we should consider the private warrior to be intrinsically ethically deficient. I 
then turned to a consideration of the analogy that is often held to apply between 
prostitution and mercenarism. Once again this analogy held nothing of substance with 
which to legitimately condemn the private warrior. Finally I considered the recent 
concerns raised by Joseph Runzo concerning the private warrior's honour. On close 
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inspection Runzo's concerns turned out to be either obviously unfounded or to 
collapse into objections considered and dispensed with earlier in this chapter. 
In conclusion, then, it is my claim that we should agree with Lynch and Walsh when 
they write that "The Good Mercenary is neither logically impossible nor 
psychologically implausible"(Lynch and Walsh 2000, 141). This does not, as I have 
said, mean that there are no consequentialist reasons for resisting the rise of the 
private military industry. In the remainder of this thesis, with the ground-clearing 
exercise of these first two chapters completed, I turn to consider one of the most 
central consequentialist concerns that are raised by those opposed to the employment 
and deployment of private military companies, namely the worry that private military 
companies are a significant threat to appropriate civil-military relations. 
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Chapter Three 
Agency Theory: A new Approach to Civil-Military Relations 
Despite trendy and dramatic academic pronouncements of the decline and fall of the 
state as the key player on the global stage, states continue doggedly on. In those few 
countries where the structures of the state have, in fact, collapsed (such as Somalia), 
the state has not been replaced by some novel new system, but has instead regressed 
to chaos and anarchy. States, then, remain important. 
Perhaps the defining feature of the state is that of its monopoly over the legitimate use 
of force, as famously expressed by Max Weber in his landmark 1918 speech Politik 
ah Beruf.51 In contemporary times, with the rise of notions such as the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, it has also been increasingly asserted that the legitimacy of 
the state's use of force is dependent on responsible civilian oversight of those state 
arms (such as the police and the military) that exercise that monopoly on behalf of the 
state. This is not the place to debate the legitimacy of undemocratic states in the 
international system. What can be confidently asserted is that the democratic control 
of armed forces, usually described in terms of 'civil-military relations', is an essential 
feature of democratic governance and an important element in the prevention of 
internal armed conflict. In a democratic state it is the people, through their properly 
elected representatives, who are to rule over every aspect of the public life of the 
nation, including (perhaps especially) the application of force. Military leaders and 
A paper derived from this chapter has recently been published as 'Agency Theory: A New Model of 
Civil-Military Relations for Africa?' (African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2007, 7 (1) p.113-136). 
57 'Politics as a Vocation'. An English translation can be found online at 
hltp,//wwvvv4iejp/asahii/moriyukiyabukuma/webet/1ecture/'politics_vocation.litml (accessed 7 June 
2007). 
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institutions must therefore be the servants, not the rulers, of the state. This feature of 
democratic states, however, contains within it a fundamental paradox - the very 
institution that is created to protect the state, the military, has the power to become its 
greatest threat. Military values are also antithetical to democratic values. As Richard 
Kohn points out, "The military is, by necessity, among the least democratic 
institutions in human experience; martial customs and procedures clash by nature with 
individual freedom and civil liberty, the highest values in democratic societies" (Kohn 
1997, 141). 
In today's world the challenge of civil control of the military has two distinct, though 
interconnected, aspects. At the most basic level, the challenge is that of preventing 
military forces from taking control of the nation's political life, whether by means of a 
coup d'etat or by way of less obvious, but no less pernicious, pressures on civilian 
government. This task is made all the more difficult by the fact that it must be 
achieved without weakening the military to the extent that it faces serious defeat on 
the battlefield, thereby placing the state and its citizens at considerable risk. This 
fundamental challenge is the one that is felt most keenly by the young democracies of 
the world. In the older democracies, where civilian control of the military is an 
established feature of the political terrain, the challenge is less dramatic, but no less 
difficult to address. Here, as Kohn puts it, 
the test is whether civilians can exercise supremacy in military policy and 
decision making - that is, frame the alternatives and define the discussion, as 
well as make the final choice. When the military enjoys great prestige, 
possesses advanced bureaucratic skills, believes that its ability to fulfil its 
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mission may be at risk, or comes to doubt the civilian leadership, civilians can 
face great obstacles in exercising their authority. (Kohn 1997, 141) 
Despite the importance of civil-military relations, theoretical understandings of this 
question have advanced surprisingly slowly in recent decades. Most academics and 
practitioners whose work touches on this issue still take as given the theory of Samuel 
P. Huntington, published nearly fifty years ago in his seminal work The Soldier and 
the State (1957). The only other academic figure to achieve a significant profile in this 
regard during the preceding fifty years is the late Morris Janowitz, whose landmark 
book The Professional Soldier (1960) explored the sociological connections between 
the military and the society it serves. Recently, however, a number of new works have 
emerged on the question of civil-military relations, that threaten (or promise) to break 
the near-monopoly that Huntington and Janowitz have long held on this field. One of 
those important recent works is Michael Desch's 1999 book Civilian Control of the 
Military, which expounds the thesis that civil-military relations are deeply affected by 
the level of threat in the security environment, and that civilian control is at its 
weakest when the threat is at its lowest. More recently we have seen the emergence of 
an impressive new theory, 'agency theory' which has been developed by Peter D. 
Feaver of Duke University, and which is comprehensively laid out in his recent book 
Armed Servants (2003). 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether Feaver's agency theory offers any 
important advances over the traditional Huntington/Janowitz 'professionalism' 
approach. In what follows I shall begin by giving a brief account of the traditional 
view, whereafter I shall present a comprehensive account of Agency Theory. I will 
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then offer an assessment of the general advantages or disadvantages of Agency 
Theory over its older competitors. As we will see, Feaver himself raises questions as 
to the applicability of his theory to states where a real threat of a coup d'etat exists. I 
will argue, however, that Agency Theory is able to deal with this issue. 
Huntington and Janowitz 
At the heart of both Huntington's and Janowitz's analysis of the military and its 
relationship to the polity, is the notion of professionalism. For both, a profession is 
defined in a fairly conventional manner, as an occupation which has highly 
specialised characteristics in the areas of expertise, responsibility and corporateness. 
Both also restrict the membership of the society of military professionals to those who 
belong to the officer corps. In terms of civil-military relations, Huntington takes the 
notion of professionalism to be at the heart of what he calls 'objective civilian control' 
of the military (Huntington 1957, 83-85 and passim). In more recent times 
Huntington helpfully summarises the features of objective civilian control as follows: 
This involves: 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by 
military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective 
subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the 
basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and 
acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and 
autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military 
intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. 
(Huntington 1995, 9 -10) 
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The key consequence of this professionalism-driven model is, in Huntington's 
account, that it provides a way to weaken the military politically (by keeping it out of 
political matters) while at the same time allowing it to be strong militarily, thereby 
ensuring both civilian control and military effectiveness (Huntington 1957, 83 - 85). 
Because his focus is more sociological than political, in many respects Janowitz's 
approach is not a competitor but is rather a complement to Huntington's theory. 
Perhaps the main difference between these theorists' views regarding civilian control 
of the military relates to their views of professional autonomy. Huntington argued for 
a strict separation between the values of the military profession and those of liberal 
civil society, and believed that the imposition or infusion of liberal values into the 
military would undermine its military effectiveness. Writing as he was in the context 
of the US participation in the Cold War, and with this belief about liberal values in 
mind, Huntington saw a real crisis looming on the horizon. He believed that in a time 
of war the only way a liberal society can meet a serious threat is by suspending its 
liberal values for the period of that war. In the case of the Cold War, however, which 
he recognised as being likely to be a long-term feature of international relations, he 
believed the only hope for survival was for liberal values to be jettisoned altogether, 
and for the US to become a conservative republic. 
In contrast to this view Janowitz argued that the distinction between war and peace 
was becoming increasingly difficult to draw in the modern world, and that military 
forces were increasingly becoming 'constabulary forces' rather than the traditional 
warfighters of old. As a result, he argued, the professional soldier, while remaining in 
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important ways distinct from his civilian counterparts, must become politically aware, 
and must of essence therefore absorb many of the values of the society he serves. This 
is sometimes describes as 'subjective' civilian control (see for example Williams 
1995). He also described how the rise of bureaucratization and the increasing 
dependence on technology in the military produced additional constraints on the 
autonomy of the military professional. 
What is common to Huntington and Janowitz is that for both of them civilian control 
of the military is assured by the military's professionalism, defined in terms of 
voluntary submission to civilian authorities - in Huntington's case, submission based 
on the incentive of civilian non-interference in the military realm; and in Janowitz' 
case, submission based on shared values. In this respect, then, Peter Feaver seems 
correct when he writes that "The tradition inspired by Moris Janowitz provides an 
important counterweight to Huntington, but on the crucial question of how civilian 
institutions control military institutions on a day-to-day basis the Janowitzean school 
does not represent a significant alternative to Huntington" (Feaver 2003, 2). In what 
follows I will outline Feaver's own theory, which I will argue represents and 
important advance over Huntington's approach. 
Feaver's Agency Theory 
Feaver makes it very clear from the start of his book that of the two aspects of civil 
military relations outlined at the beginning of this chapter - the fundamental issue of 
establishing and maintaining civilian control over the might of the military, on the one 
hand, and the day-to-day control over policy decisions on the other - it is the latter at 
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which his Agency Theory is directed. This remains, however, a central problem for 
the democratic state. For though it is not its physical coercive power that causes the 
military to be a challenge in this regard, the military nonetheless also wields power in 
other forms - its claim to special expertise in military matters, the general prestige of 
the military, and so on. Apart from the practical dangers, this also poses a danger to 
the principle of democratic governance - that in a democracy the citizenry by 
definition retains the right to decide, through their elected representatives, on all 
matters of state, even on matters in which experts (such as the military58) may have 
greater expertise. As Feaver neatly puts it, "In a democracy, civilians have the right to 
be wrong" (Feaver 2003, 65). 
Feaver focuses on comparing his theory with Huntington only. Janowitz is set aside 
because, "when it comes to understanding the day-to-day political management of the 
military, the Janowitzean approach does not differ from the Huntingtonian on any 
fundamental issue" (Feaver 2003, 9). The central difference between Feaver and 
Huntington is that, while not declaring these irrelevant, Feaver's focus is not on 
nonmaterial determinants of behaviour (such as beliefs, norms and identity), but on 
material factors. For Huntington the central variable in civil-military relations is one 
of identity, the identity of the military officer as a professional. 
As Feaver points out (Feaver 2003, 300), there is some evidence that the general presumption that 
the military is more likely to be correct than civilians on questions of national security is not 
necessarily the case. In this Feaver points particularly to Eliot A. Cohen's important work Supreme 
Command (Cohen 2002). Feaver comments as follows: 
"History shows that the military is not as "right" in civil-military disputes as the military triumphalists 
might suppose. But even when the military is right, democratic theory intervenes and insists that it 
submit to the civilian leadership that the polity has chosen. Let civilian voters punish civilian leaders 
for wrong decisions. Let the military advise against foolish adventures, even advising strenuously when 
circumstances demand. But let the military execute those orders faithfully. The republic would be 
better served even by foolish working than by enlightened shirking." (Feaver 2003, 302) 
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Against this Feaver builds a model that draws on principal-agent theory, a framework 
widely used in economic and political analysis. Its goal is to address problems of 
agency, particularly between actors in a position of superiority or authority 
(principals) and their subordinates (agents). The classic case is perhaps the employer-
employee relationship. In such cases the goal of principal-agent theory is to address 
the problem of how the employer ensures that the employee does what is required of 
her, or in other terms, how the employer ensures that the employee is 'working' rather 
than 'shirking'. Feaver argues that civil-military relations can be seen as "an 
interesting special case" (Feaver 2003, 12) of the principal-agent relationship. 
Because this 'special case' has features that are unique and not broadly applicable to 
other principal-agent relationships, Feaver coins the term 'Agency Theory' to 
describe it (Feaver 2003, 55). 
At the heart of Agency Theory is the idea that civil-military relations is essentially a 
form of strategic interaction between civilian masters (principals) and their military 
servants (agents). In that strategic interaction civilians choose methods by which to 
monitor the military. What methods are chosen depends on what expectations the 
civilians have about the degree to which the military will submit to their authority. 
Submission or obedience, is, in Feaver's terminology, 'working', while rebellion or 
refusal to obey is 'shirking'. "The military decides whether to obey in this way, based 
on military expectations of whether shirking will be detected and, if so, whether 
civilians will punish them for it. These expectations are a function of overlap between 
the preferences of the civilian and the military players, and the political strength of the 
actors" (Feaver 2003, 3). 
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minimisation of civilian interference in military affairs. All of these preferences can 
lead the military to attempt to influence policy in ways that undermine civilian 
control. In terms of democratic governance, this is pernicious even when such 
interference leads to better security arrangements than would otherwise have been 
achieved. Dealing with this is made all the more difficult by the fact that the military 
agent carries a particular moral status - her willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice 
for her country acts in some sense as a moral counterweight to the civilian principal's 
political competence. As a consequence, "the moral ambiguity of the relationship 
bolsters the hand of a military agent should he choose to resist civilian direction" 
(Feaver 2003, 71-72). 
The other central problem for civil-military relations, in terms of Feaver's principal-
agent derived theory, is the 'adverse selection problem'. This is the problem facing 
the principal in selecting which agent to contract with to undertake the required task. 
The agent has a strong incentive to portray herself as being far more diligent than she 
is, in order to ensure that she is contracted, which complicates the principal's task of 
selecting the best possible agent for the job. In civil-military terms the task is one of 
leadership selection - which potential senior officers are most likely to lead the 
military to work rather than to shirk? The special nature of the military context gives 
this problem a unique twist. Feaver seems right to point out, for example, that it is 'at 
least plausible' that the sort of personality that is advantageous on the battlefield is by 
nature problematic in terms of the principal-agent relationship (Feaver 2003, 72). 
Indeed, as we have seen, this is one of the central reasons that Huntington stresses a 
sharp differentiation of the civilian and military spheres. 
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So described, Feaver's Agency Theory offers a very useful descriptive framework by 
which to understand civil-military relations. In the next section 1 turn to a 
consideration of the main advantages that arise from the application of Agency 
Theory. 
Agency Theory: General Advantages 
At its most basic, the notion of professionalism as Huntington uses it raises questions 
of circularity. For the defining feature of military professionalism, in Huntington's 
account, is that of voluntary submission to civilian authority. "A highly professional 
officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures 
legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington 1957, 74). This obviously raises 
questions about definitional circularity - objective civilian control is defined in terms 
of military professionalism, while military professionalism is defined as voluntary 
submission by the military to civilian control. Another problem with Huntington's 
approach, as Kohl points out, is that "while "objective" civilian control might 
minimize military involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian control over 
military affairs" (Kohn 1997,143). 
The most obvious advantage of Agency Theory is that it introduces material factors 
into the account, something that is clearly missing from the theories proffered by 
Huntington and Janowitz, while at the same time not excluding the nonmaterial 
factors (like identity and moral commitments) highlighted by these theorists. That this 
matters is demonstrated convincingly by Feaver in the central chapters of Armed 
Servants, where he shows that Agency Theory fits far more closely with real-world 
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civil-military relations - the cases of Cold War and post-Cold War civil-military 
relations - than its main rival, Huntington's theory of 'objective civilian control'. 
By contrast, Agency Theory offers both a means of accurately measuring civilian 
control of the military, and mechanisms for addressing the constantly-threatened 
imbalance in the civil-military relationship. These control and monitoring 
mechanisms address the issue that is at the heart of both the moral hazard and the 
adverse selection problems - information - by providing means whereby the principal 
can cause the agent to reveal the necessary information, or else by adjusting the 
incentives on offer to the agent in ways that can give the principal confidence that the 
agents preferences are in line with those held by the principal. 
Among the central means of monitoring singled out by Feaver are the following 
(Feaver2003,76-85): 
1. Restricting the scope of delegation to the military. Devising 
strategy, drawing up operational plans, directing the equipping and 
provisioning of the military, and setting rules of engagement are 
among the means civilians can employ to achieve this. 
2. Contractual incentives. This less intrusive approach 'builds in' 
incentives to the contract between the principal and the agent. Feaver 
points out that the military's desire for autonomy might well fit here. 
"Since monitoring mechanisms vary in their degree of intrusiveness, 
and assuming that the military prefers less intrusive means, civilians 
have a powerful incentive with which to influence military behavior: 
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offer to use less intrusive means to monitor military agents" (Feaver 
2003, 78). 
3. Screening and selection mechanisms. Such mechanisms (referred to 
as 'accession policy', in the military context) enable civilians to 
address the adverse selection problem, and also provides (in a 
relatively unintrusive manner) information that can help the civilian in 
predicting the future behaviour of the military agents thereby selected. 
4. 'Fire alarms'. These are third parties who have an interest in the 
behaviour of the agent in question, and who therefore monitor the 
agent. In the civil-military context it is primarily defense-orientated 
think tanks and the media that play this role, but other less formal 
groups (such as draftees in a conscription-based military) can play the 
same role. Interservice rivalry can also function in this way. 
5. 'Police patrols'. This describes principal-initiated investigations of the 
agent, such as (in the civil-military context) audits and public hearings, 
and is a significantly more intrusive form of monitoring than those 
already mentioned. 
6. Revocation of delegated authority. Where necessary, civilian 
principals retain the option of withdrawing authority that has 
previously been delegated to the military. This can either be a complete 
withdrawal (by, for example, re-delegating a particular area of 
responsibility to a competing arm of the state, such as the police or 
intelligence community), or a partial withdrawal, in which the civilian 
agency involved takes on greater powers over, for example, the 
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planning of military operations. This is the most intrusive form of 
monitoring. 
These monitoring mechanisms are general features of most accounts of the principal-
agent relationship, though obviously their specific application to the civil-military 
context is new. What sets Agency Theory apart from other principal-agent theories, 
however, is the close attention that is given to punishment mechanisms. The general 
principal-agent literature tends to take punishment for granted. But this is clearly 
significantly more difficult in the context of civil-military relations, due to the unique 
coercive power that is incumbent in military forces. As Feaver points out, history is 
replete with examples of coups that have been triggered by an attempt to punish the 
military for some or other indiscretion. Thus the first question here is whether or not 
civilian principals can in fact punish the military. In what may be viewed as a major 
concession to Huntington, Feaver expressly sidesteps this question, arguing that it is 
not relevant in a discussion of Agency Theory, which takes as given a relationship in 
which the military understands itself in the role of the agent, subservient to its civilian 
masters. (Feaver 2003, 89) Nonetheless, Feaver makes his own view of the 
prerequisites for punishment mechanisms in the civil-military context very clear, 
when he writes that 
the power to punish rests on a normative foundation - that is, the willingness 
of the military to be punished - and this normative foundation is thus a 
prerequisite for democratic civil-military relations. It exists in the United 
States and other advanced democracies but not necessarily in all countries. As 
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discussed in the concluding chapter, this may limit the applicability of the 
agency model to other countries. (Feaver 2003, 90) 
This is an important qualification of Agency Theory, one to which I shall return in the 
next section. 
Where punishment is a possibility, there are, Feaver argues, a wide range of 
punishment options available to civilians, which generally fall into the following five 
categories (Feaver 2003, 90 - 93): 
1. Intrusive monitoring. As described above. 
2. Budget cuts and withdrawal of privileges. Given that shirking 
often involves offering inflated estimates of threats and costs in 
order to boost the military's share of the national budget, this is 
often a particularly appropriate punishment mechanism. 
3. 'Forced detachment from the military'. This is the military 
equivalent of 'firing' a shirking agent. The US military's 'up-or-
out' career path system, in which military personnel who do not 
achieve promotion within a set time-limit are discharged from the 
service, is one mechanism of this kind. Another option available in 
the US military system is that of forcing a disgraced officer to 
retire at a rank lower than that achieved, which again results in a 
significant financial loss.59 
A recent example of this is the case of Janis Karpinski, who was the Brigadier General in command 
of the Abu Ghraib prison, but who was demoted and dismissed from the service at the rank of Colonel. 
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4. Military justice. Military law, such as that encapsulated in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, provides for a range of 
punishments (including dismissal and imprisonment) that can be 
applied to transgressing military agents. 
5. Extralegal civilian action. There are a range of actions a civilian 
principal can take beyond the legal system that can be quite 
effective, such as publicly reprimanding military agents.60 
These mechanisms for monitoring and punishment represent a clear advantage for 
Agency Theory over its rivals, which offer no framework of this kind. In terms of 
analysis, the practical value of Agency Theory is clear. Feaver is correct when he 
writes that "[ajgency theory cues us to look for certain things and to ask certain 
questions in a case study and thereby illuminates the give and take of day-to-day civil-
military relations in ways that a straightforward journalistic account might miss" 
(Feaver 2003, 234). Furthermore, Agency Theory offers a way of understanding civil-
military relations that extends beyond the traditional concern with coups to the 
everyday strategic interactions between the military agent and the civilian principal. 
The presumption that the military will desire to shirk - where this is understood as 
more than simply disobeying orders - is an important one, and emphasises the need 
for civilians to be constantly vigilant. In addition, Agency Theory offers a means of 
systematically analysing historical examples of civil-military relations, which Feaver 
himself does very thoroughly in his analysis of Cold War and Post-Cold War US 
civil-military relations. 
60 In addition to these five categories of punishment, Feaver muses that, under some circumstances, war 
itself, which can inflict significant hardship on the military, might be understood as a form of 
punishment. He concludes, however, that war is too rare an occurrence for this to be considered a 
meaningful punishment mechanism. 
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It is also clear that Agency Theory, as outlined by Feaver, offers scope for further 
development, and can incorporate insights from other theories (such as Huntington's) 
without changing its basic structure. This flexibility is important in the context of 
today's rapidly changing security environment, in which military forces are 
increasingly deployed in unfamiliar roles, with potentially unexpected results for 
civil-military relations. Related to this is another advantage of Agency Theory, 
namely that it "preserves the civilian-military distinction - the sine qua non of all 
civil-military theory - but without reliance on an ideal-type division of labor. And it 
preserves the military subordination conception essential to democratic theory, 
without assuming military obedience" (Feaver 2003, 10). 
Clearly then, there are good reasons for considering Agency Theory to be among the 
most useful frameworks for the analysis of civil-military relations - at least in the 
day-to-day strategic interactions between the military agent and the civilian principal 
- currently in existence. An important question remains however. Given Feaver's own 
restrictions of the scope of Agency Theory to mature democracies where there is a 
normative presumption of civil control of the military, how applicable is it in dealing 
with the possibility of coups? Our purpose in analysing Agency Theory is to assess 
it's general utility, but with a particular eye to its possible application to private 
military companies. Given that there is genuine concern among analysts and the 
public that private military companies might overthrow legitimate governments, it is 
essential that Agency Theory be able to deal with the possibility of coups and 
attempted coups if it is to be of utility for this project. 
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Agency Theory and Coups 
Because Feaver's focus is on US civil-military relations, he is careful to emphasise 
that his conclusions regarding the applicability of Agency Theory can only be seen as 
applicable in mature democracies like the US, where the submission of the military to 
civilian authority is a normative presumption. That disclaimer in place, Feaver also 
recognises that the obvious next step for Agency Theory research is to examine 
whether it is applicable in less stable democracies, where the threat of coups is a real 
one. Although Feaver doesn't attempt any kind of systematic answer to this question, 
it seems that his intuitions lead him in different directions. On the one hand, he 
stresses the connection between Agency Theory and the normative presumption of 
civilian oversight mentioned above. (Feaver 2003, 90) On the other hand, despite his 
laudable conservatism in not extrapolating results beyond the scope of his 
investigation, he is unable to completely restrain a cautious optimism on this point: 
Agency Theory may even make some contributions to the study of civil-
military relations in countries where the threat of coups is real. After all, a 
coup represents the ultimate in shirking - reversing the principal-agent 
relationship so that the old agent (the military) becomes the new principal (the 
dictator). Pathological civil-military interactions within the agency framework 
could end up in a coup. (Feaver 2003, 293) 
Despite this flash of optimism, Feaver immediately expresses his belief that if Agency 
Theory were to be applied to 'coup-ridden' states it would require significant 
modification. It is on this point that I find myself for the first time in disagreement 
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with Feaver. For the essence of the principal-agent relationship is that it is a 'game' of 
strategic interaction between two parties, where each party is presumed to be seeking 
dominance. Thus, as long as both parties exist (i.e. where civilian government is real 
rather than just a front for the military) then there will be the 'game' of strategic 
interaction between the two, and therefore there is a good prima facie reason to 
believe that Agency Theory will be applicable. The central question is whether, under 
such conditions, civilian monitoring and punishment is possible. Even where it is not, 
measuring such cases against Agency Theory enables a clear and objective judgement 
about civil-military relations in that particular state to be made. 
One example will suffice. An important recent study by Patrick J. McGowan of coups 
in West Africa between 1955 and 2004 leads him to conclude that "[i]n contrast to 
the rest of the world, where "coups became less common and less effective from the 
1970s onward," West Africa remains the most coup-prone region in the world" 
(McGowan 2006, 238). A significant factor in the cycle of coups in West Africa, 
according to McGowan, is the structure of military forces, which tend to break down 
into factions. McGowan quotes Decalo who points out that "many African armies 
bear little resemblance to a modern complex organizational model and are instead a 
coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually 
competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and 
personal grievances" (quoted in McGowan 2006, 238). Agency Theory offers a ready 
framework to see why such a military structure makes coups more likely. Such 
conditions make monitoring and punishment of the sort outlined by Agency Theory 
very difficult, and thereby increase the likelihood of shirking among the military. 
96 
McGowan's study also brings to light some interesting data on what factors seem to 
have decreased the likelihood of coups in West Africa. A crucial factor seems to be 
the quality of the political leadership in the countries concerned. In this regard he 
writes of the recent history of Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana and Mali as follows: 
What clearly does make these four states different from the rest of West Africa 
is the quality of their political leadership since independence in the cases of 
Cape Verde and Senegal and since the coups that brought Jerry Rawlings and 
Amadou Toure to power in Ghana and Mali. Senegal has benefited from three 
presidents who rank among Africa's most accomplished statesmen: Presidents 
Senghor (1960-1980), Diouf (1981-2000), and Wade (2000-). It is noteworthy 
that President Diouf made an up-to-then-unprecedented military intervention 
in Gambia in 1981 to suppress what otherwise would have been a successful 
coup against President Jawara. Presidents Pereira and Monteiro stepped down 
after losing democratic elections in CapeVerde in 1991 and 2000. Pereira 
strongly opposed the first successful military coup in Guinea- Bissau in 1980, 
broke diplomatic relations, and removed from the Cape Verde Constitution 
provisions relating to an eventual union between the two counties. (McGowan 
2006,248 - 249) 
Once again Agency Theory provides a ready answer for why this is the case. The 
strong political leadership referred to here is precisely the sort of factor that Agency 
Theory would predict as being likely to lead to success in the civil-military realm, 
given that civil-military relations is at heart a strategic interaction between the civilian 
principal and the military agent. Furthermore, the type of strength involved in this 
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leadership is important. This is not 'strong man' leadership, but rather leadership that 
willingly emphasises and devolves power to democratic institutions. These are 
precisely the conditions that optimise the possibilities for the operation of the types of 
material factors outlined in Agency Theory. 
An important factor that Feaver has overlooked is the fact that, even in states where 
there is no presumption that the military will submit to civilian oversight, and where 
civilian governments have few resources with which to apply coercive power over 
military agents, these civilian governments can still put into place both monitoring 
and punishment mechanisms, by means of its involvement in regional organisations. 
In the African context organisations like the African Union and SADC offer a prime 
example. Such organisations include principles and commitments that have a direct 
impact on military subservience to civilian governments. Take for example Operation 
Boleas, the 1998 SADC intervention in Lesotho, which was a response to a suspected 
coup. The justification for that intervention was explicitly an appeal to a clear SADC 
principle rejecting the military overthrow of civilian governments. The AU has shown 
a similar commitment to this principle - in recent times, for example, Mauritania has 
had its membership of the AU revoked as a result of a military coup in 2005. 
Furthermore, the AU has in its toolbox the African Peer Review Mechanism which 
seems to give ample scope for the monitoring of civil-military relations. Punishments 
available to address transgressions of accepted norms of military submission to 
civilian authority could range in severity from military intervention to oust the coup 
plotters (as in the case of Lesotho), sanctions, and diplomatic censure - where coups 
have actually taken place - to more limited measures that affect only the military 
directly, for less serious forms of shirking. Examples of these limited measures could 
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include ejection from prestigious regional military arrangements such as the AU 
standby battalions, withdrawal of training and other assistance, expulsion of officers 
of the offending military from military colleges in other countries, and the like. 
McGowan, albeit cautiously, affirms a similar view from the perspective of his 
empirical study of coups in West Africa. In this regard he points out that: 
the new African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development explicitly reject military coups and military rule and were able 
to reverse a successful coup in Sao Tome and Principe in July 2003, although 
such pressure did not work to reverse Francois Bozize's successful coup in the 
Central African Republic in March 2003. This pan-African initiative may have 
discouraged some West African militaries from plotting and attempting coups. 
However, the claim that "the days of the coup in Africa are numbered and 
while the response may be a little slow and a little ad hoc, the AU will do what 
it can by any means necessary to ensure that regime changes take the form of 
legitimate expressions of the will of the people" seems premature at this 
juncture because the AU does not have the capacity to compel democratic 
behavior as shown by the successful coup in Mauritania on August 3, 2005. 
This said, if foreign-aid-donor nations would cooperate with the AU and 
withhold aid from any country that experiences a coup, "together, they could 
help make African coups a scourge of the past."(McGowan 2006, 242) 
As McGowan's analysis implies, focusing on the lack of impact of regional 
organisations in recent history in Africa misses the point. The point is that such 
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actions are conceptually possible, and in some cases have been actualised. Punishing 
coups can be done - how much punishment results, and how much of a deterrent there 
is against coups as a result, depends on how seriously civilian principals take the 
threat and how much they are prepared to invest in the deterrent. 
Thus there seems good reason to reject Feaver's claim that "Agency Theory is only 
applicable in those settings where the military conceives of itself as the agent of the 
civilian; crucial to that conception is a recognition of the civilian's right to sanction, 
and hence an explicit commitment to submit to sanctions" (Feaver 2003, 89). More 
important than this is the possibility of monitoring and punishment mechanisms even 
in cases where the military's commitment to principles of civilian oversight are 
limited or even non-existent, and as we have seen this is a real possibility. 
A further advantage of Agency Theory in the context of weak democracies like those 
common in Africa lies in its value with regard to attempts to 'democratise' military 
forces that have traditionally existed as part of totalitarian regimes. Democratisation 
programmes, given the Huntingtonian orthodoxy, have tended to focus on inculcating 
a professional ethos among the officers of the military in question. While there is 
undoubtedly value in such training (which, as we have seen above, can be 
incorporated into the theoretical matrix of Agency Theory), this can only be seen as a 
long-term strategy, for such values take time to become embedded into the ethos of a 
military force. In the shorter term, a clear grasp of the monitoring/punishment 
relationship described by Agency Theory can allow for immediate implementation of 
practical mechanisms for the oversight of the military. The presumption that the 
military will desire to shirk is a particularly useful one in such contexts. 
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It seems therefore that there are good reasons to believe that Agency Theory is 
flexible and robust enough to address situations in which the threat of coups is a very 
real one. It is clear, also, that the Agency Theory represents a major advance over the 
Huntingtonian orthodoxy in understanding and managing civil-military relations. In 
the next two chapters I present an Agency Theory based evaluation of the impact of 
private military companies on civil-military relations, or what I describe as civil-
private) military relations. 
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Chapter Four 
Civil- (Private) Military Relations: The Strategic Challenge 
"[Private Military Companies] challenge one of the basic premises of the study of 
international security: that states possess a monopoly over the use of force, and thus 
the study of security can be based on the premise that states constitute the sole unit of 
analysis " (Singer 2003, 233) 
As we have seen, although the private provision of military services is by no means a 
new phenomenon, what is new in our era is the fact that many Western governments 
are increasingly seeing private military companies as legitimate service providers. 
This shift has troubled many commentators in academia and the policy world, for a 
range of different reasons. One of the central concerns that is regularly voiced is the 
worry that the outsourcing of traditional military functions into private hands could 
potentially undermine civil-military relations. Given the traditional view of civil-
military relations, one defined by Samuel Huntington in his classic book The Soldier 
and the State, it is hardly surprising that this should be a cause for concern. Following 
this orthodoxy, the central determinants of appropriate civil-military relations are 
'soft' factors, primarily such features as military professionalism, honour and a 
culture of submission to civil authority. Clearly, while private military companies 
may sometimes display these features, there is no particular reason to think that they 
will. Elke Krahmann expresses this concern well when she writes that, 
High levels of mutual interpenetration and common identity are regarded as 
supportive of democratic civil-military relations because they increase the 
102 
commitment of the armed forces to the defence of their society, ensure that the 
military shares societal norms and beliefs, and facilitate support of 
government policies. The model of the private military contractor undermines 
these historically established means of democratic control in a number of ways 
and thus requires a revision of traditional civil-military relations. (Krahmann 
forthcoming 2008) 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Huntington's approach has been 
challenged by a new theory of civil-military relations, one advocated by Peter Feaver. 
Feaver's 'Agency Theory', while recognising the importance of the soft factors so 
central to Huntington's approach, also recognises the importance a range of 'hard' 
determinants of whether military forces submit to democratically elected civilian 
leadership. It is the central hypothesis of this thesis that Agency Theory provides a 
superior analytic tool for addressing the question of appropriate relations between 
private military companies and democratically elected governments. In this chapter 
and the one that follows, I will attempt to show that, rather than the blanket 
condemnation of private military companies that seems to result from the application 
of Huntington's model of civil-military relations, Agency Theory provides a far more 
agile tool that can advance the debate over military privatisation by giving a 
significantly more fine-grained account of what is necessary for appropriate civil -
private military relations. As Singer points out, this kind of analysis is largely missing 
from the academic literature: 
From its very beginning, the underlying basis of current civil-military relations 
theory has been fairly simple. Essentially it is a story of balancing proper 
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civilian control with the military professionals' need for autonomy to do their 
jobs properly. Although ongoing debates over where exactly these lines of 
control should be drawn, the whole of civil-military relations theory, 
regardless of its viewpoint, sticks to this general assumption of a dualistic 
balance between soldiers and state. Presently, civil-military relations theory 
does not fully account for any potential role of external, third-party influences 
on this two-sided structure. (Singer 2003, 196) 
It is critical that this analysis be carried out, in order to ensure that we avoid falling 
into the trap, pointed out by Musah and Fayemi, of those scholars "who see the use of 
today's mercenaries as the effective antidote for insecurity in zones of complex 
emergencies, but pay little or no attention to the subversion of the very state 
sovereignty the mercenaries claim to protect" (Musah and Fayemi 2000, 27). 
In this chapter I begin this analysis by considering the more general features of 
Agency Theory and their applicability to civil- private military relations. The 
following chapter examines the specific issues of monitoring and punishing the 
private military agent, in the light of Agency Theory. 
Civil-military relations, contracting, and delegation 
As we have seen, Feaver argues convincingly that civil-military relations are 
essentially a strategic interaction between civilian governments and the military, 
which civilians create and contract with for the purpose of protecting society from its 
enemies (and, we might add - beyond Feaver's own account - for the purpose of 
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pursuing some of the civilian government's policy goals). "It is strategic interaction 
because the choices civilians make are contingent on their expectations of what the 
military is likely to do, and vice versa" (Feaver 2003, 54). The relationship is also a 
hierarchical one, particularly in democratic societies where it is a core principle of 
democratic theory that the military be subservient to the elected representatives of the 
populace. The purpose of this section of this chapter is to consider whether or not 
there is any substantial difference in the nature of the essential relationship between 
civilian principals and state military agents, on the one hand, and that between civilian 
principals and private military agents on the other. Critics of the private military 
industry have strongly expressed their concerns in this regard. Elke Krahmann, for 
example, expresses deep concerns over the effects of "disconnect between military 
service and duty to the state" (Krahmann forthcoming 2008), while Herfried Munkler 
expresses the opinion that 
a continuation of this tendency [towards military privatisation] would have 
enormous political consequences, as the armed force would be subject to weak 
control by governments (linked only by the employment relationship). ... 
Privatized warfare would rapidly take on a disastrous life of its own, in 
accordance with the laws of the market. (Munkler 2005, 134 - 135) 
In what follows I shall begin to explore whether such concerns are justified. 
A key commonality, but one that is not necessarily obvious when civil-military 
relations is viewed outside of the Agency Theory framework, is that in both cases the 
relationship is one of delegation. This is most obvious in the case of the private 
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military company, for the notion of delegation is built into the very essence of the 
commercial contract. As Feaver points out, however, the same goes for the state 
military: "In the civil-military context, the civilian principal contracts with the 
military agent to develop the ability to use force in defense of the civilian's interests" 
(Feaver 2003, 57). This is an important point to recognise, for the essential objection 
made by many opponents of military privatisation is that it is inappropriate to delegate 
military tasks to non-governmental organisations. Peter W. Singer, for example, 
writes that 
[w]hen the government delegates out part of its role in national security 
though the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces, it is abdicating an 
essential responsibility. When the forms of public protection are hired through 
private means, the citizens of society do not enjoy security by right of their 
membership in a state. Rather, it results from the coincidence between the 
firm's contract parameters, its profitability, and the specific contracting 
members' interests. Thus, when marketized, security is often not about 
collective good, but about private means and ends. (Singer 2003, 226) 
However, once it is recognised that state military forces are distinct organisations to 
which elected civilian governments delegate some of the responsibility of protecting 
the state and pursuing the state's vital interests, it is hard to see how this can stand as 
a meaningful objection. For delegation is the essence of democracy: citizens delegate 
to their elected representatives the responsibility to rule, and those representatives in 
turn delegate to others the specific tasks that must be carried out in order to actualize 
that rule. These relationships can also be expressed in terms of contracts, as in social 
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contract theory. The form of the contract between the civilian principal and the 
military agent may look somewhat different to more standard contractual 
arrangements - involving as it does various cultural rituals, symbols and honours -
but a contract it is nonetheless. 
Feaver points out that "[t]he primary claim of the principal-agent literature is that 
delegation need not be an abdication of responsibility" (Feaver 2003, 55). This is 
because delegation need not mean a loss of control. As we shall see, a number of 
means are available to civilian principals by which to make state military agents to do 
what they are supposed to do. In the next chapter I will examine whether these 
monitoring and punishment mechanisms can be applied in the case of civil- (private) 
military relations. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to establish whether 
private agents alter the fundamental strategic relationship that generally holds 
between military forces and civilian agents. In so doing it is important we keep in 
mind Avant's point that "There is generally some loss of control, or slippage, 
associated with any delegation; the question should not be how private choices 
compare with an ideal relationship, but how they compare with other available 
options" (Avant 2005, 43). 
What underlies the strategic relationship between civilians and the state military is the 
fact that there is a strong likelihood of a divergence of preferences between the two 
parties. This is the essence of the principal-agent problematique. Although there may 
at times be shared preferences among both parties, the very nature of the two-sided 
relationship opens up the potential for divergence. Various factors contribute to this 
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potential - differing views of what national security goals should be, differing views 
of how to pursue those goals, the natural desire for the military to build the biggest 
'empire' possible, the natural desire of the civilians to limit the size and scope of the 
military to what they deem is necessary to achieve security, and so on. As Feaver 
points out, "the military has the ability and sometimes also the incentive to respond 
strategically to civilian delegation and control decisions - in the jargon of principal-
agency, to shirk rather than to work" (Feaver 2003, 57). This defines the strategic 
relationship on the military's side. On the other side, the civilian principal has the 
desire to ensure that the military works rather than shirks, and so sets out to set in 
place mechanisms for making this so. Feaver sums up the results as follows: 
In sum, civil-military relations is a game of strategic interaction. The "players" 
are civilian leaders and military agents. Each makes "moves" based on its own 
preferences for outcomes and its expectations of how the other side is likely to 
act. The game is influenced by exogenous factors, for instance the intensity of 
the external threat facing the state made up of the players. The game is also 
influenced by uncertainties. The civilians cannot be sure that the military will 
do what they want; the military agents cannot be sure that the civilians will 
catch and punish them if they misbehave. (Feaver 2003, 58) 
Returning to our central concern, we must ask the question of whether this description 
would read any differently if Feaver had written it about civil- (private) military 
relations, in which the "players" are civilian leaders and private military agents? 
Given that Agency Theory is derived from principal-agent theory developed in the 
context of commercial relationships between employers and employees, and that this 
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is essentially the same kind of relationship as applies between civilian leaders and 
private military agents, there seems very little reason to think that the strategic 
relationship should be any different. The only significant difference between the state 
military and private military companies in this context is that there is generally only 
one official state military for any particular country (albeit one divided into different 
services), while there is potentially a plethora of private military companies 
competing for state contracts. If anything, however, this difference favours the private 
military companies when it comes to the application of Agency Theory. As Feaver 
points out, there is something anomalous in applying principal-agent theory to the 
issue of civil-military relations because "[t] here is not really a market of agents; the 
civilian cannot hire from many different militaries to do its work. The principal can 
create new military agents, and does so from time to time, but there is something of a 
monopoly in providing security"61 (Feaver 2003, 314, note 6). Feaver argues 
implicitly, and I believe successfully, that this anomaly does not undermine the 
applicability of the principal-agent framework to the sphere of civil-military relations. 
But it is worth noting that no such anomaly applies to the relationship between private 
military companies and state employers. Instead the latter relationship is a classic case 
of principal-agent interaction. 
In broad terms then, it seems that the basic strategic relationship between civilian 
principals and state military agents, on the one hand, is not significantly different to 
In the same footnote Feaver notes that in traditional civil-military relations "the government enjoys a 
monopsomy in purchasing security." It is generally held that, in terms of social contract theory, it is 
essential that the state hold the monopoly on violence. This is a point that is sometimes raised to argue 
for the illegitimacy of private military companies. It's a nice question, however, whether it is not more 
accurate to say that social contract theory requires the state to have a monopsomy with regard to 
violence. Unfortunately the constraints of this thesis do not allow me to pursue this question, though it 
is my hunch that this is indeed what is, in fact, implied by social contract theory. The undermining of 
this monopsomy seems to me far more of a threat to appropriate civil-military relations than is the loss 
of the state military's monopoly on force. 
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that between civilian principals and private military agents. In the next section I 
consider the specific goals civilian principals have in the context of military force, and 
evaluate whether there is any significant divergence here between what civilians want 
from state military forces and private military forces. 
Functional and Relational Goals 
The central challenge presented to civilian principals by the nature of the strategic 
relationship at the heart of civil-military relations, is the danger that military shirking 
will lead to significantly 'suboptimal arrangements' ranging from battlefield collapse, 
unwanted wars and coups; to simply placing an unwarranted economic burden on 
society. This problem is minimised when there is a convergence of preferences 
between civilians and their military agents. This can sometimes be achieved through, 
for example, promoting senior officers who have shown themselves to share the 
preferences of their civilian masters. Feaver, however, argues that there are limits to 
how far this goes: 
For starters, military communities have strong identities that mark them as 
"different" from those of civilians, and this is deliberately cultivated and 
signified through uniforms, oaths of office, rituals, and so on; there is, in other 
words, some irreducible difference between military and civilian, and this will 
naturally extend to different perspectives. Moreover, the civil-military 
difference is compounded by the different role each plays, one as principal, the 
other as agent; there is a de minimis difference in perspective that attends 
agency, hiring someone else to do something for you. (Feaver 2003, 60) 
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The range of monitoring and punishment mechanisms I will focus on in the next 
chapter are designed to address this unavoidable problem in civil-military relations. 
But a prior question to that of means of securing compliance is that of just what goals 
civilian principals have with which they desire military agents to comply. Feaver 
singles out two central goals that it can be presumed that civilian principals have with 
regard to military servants: "Civilians want protection from external enemies and 
want to remain in political control over their destiny" (Feaver 2003, 62). As we saw in 
the previous chapter, Feaver calls the first of these goals the functional goal, and the 
second the relational goal. These goals can be further broken down into specific tasks: 
The functional goal includes the following: 
1. whether the military is doing what civilians asked it to do, to 
include instances where civilians have expressed a preference 
on both the "what" and the "how" of any given action; 
2. whether the military is working to the fullest extent of its duty 
to do what the civilians asked it to do; 
3. whether the military is competent (measured by some 
reasonableness standard) to do what civilians asked it to do. 
The relational goal can be broken down into the following: 
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1. whether the civilian is the one who is making key policy 
decisions (i.e., no de facto or de jure coup) and whether 
those decisions are substantive rather than nominal; 
2. whether the civilian is the one who decides which decisions 
civilians should make and which decisions can be left to the 
military; 
3. whether the military is avoiding any behavior that 
undermines civilian supremacy in the long run even if it is 
fulfilling civilian functional orders. (Feaver 2003, 62) 
Returning to our central quest, we must ask at this point whether there is anything 
different here if we substitute private military companies for state military forces? 
Once again it is hard to see why there should be any difference here. 
While the desires civilian principals have for the behaviour of private military agents 
appears to be little different from the desires they have for the behaviour of state 
military agents, there are clear differences between the preferences of state militaries 
and those of private military forces. One important difference here between state 
militaries and private forces arises from the fact that private military companies are 
only paid when they are deployed, while state militaries are paid even when they are 
not employed in their primary warfighting role. In terms of the strategic game 
described by Agency Theory, the ideal situation for the state military is where 
civilians view the threat environment as a threatening one and fund the military 
accordingly, but where the military does not in fact have to deploy or fight, thereby 
avoiding all the costs incurred. As we put it in the previous chapter, the military agent 
112 
has a preference for policies that do not needlessly risk his life, as well as for policies 
that give overwhelming supremacy on the battlefield. Feaver points out that this 
results in a danger that state militaries will use their advisory role to pump up 
estimates of what military power is required to resist possible threats, while also using 
their advisory role to minimise the number and extent of their actual deployments. As 
Feaver puts it, "[TJhere is an exceedingly blurry line between advising against a 
course of action and resisting civilian efforts to pursue that course of action. 
Sometimes negative advice can rise to the level of shirking, especially if the advice is 
exaggerated" (Feaver 2003, 62). 
Following the same strategic logic, it appears that private military companies will be 
inclined to shirk in the other direction. As they are paid to deploy and receive no 
income from the state when not deployed, they are likely to be prone to downplaying 
the likely cost of intervention while at the same time exaggerating the benefits 
thereof. Thus, where the state military is strategically inclined to shirk in the direction 
of inertia, the private military company is inclined to shirk by seeking to deploy more 
often than is in fact necessary. Some commentators express concern of what they see 
as the broader implications of this.Musah and Fayemi, for example, argue that "it is in 
the interest of the new mercenaries that the world remains in a perpetual state of 
instability" and that, as a result "their 'solutions' are often short-term" (Musah and 
Fayemi 2000, 28). 
Does this difference amount to a significant problem when considered from the 
perspective of the civilian principal? I argue that it is not. The first point to note is that 
both preferences, if carried through, result in shirking, and so there is no difference in 
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the type of problem these preferences potentially raise. In both cases the civilian 
principal has a duty to make herself aware of these preferences and their potential 
dangers, and act to ensure that those potential dangers do not become actual. Thus, for 
example, a civilian principal who is aware of the private military company's potential 
to exaggerate the benefits of military action can employ another company to act 
purely as an advisor on these matters - i.e. the latter company will gain no benefit if a 
decision is made to deploy. The fact that the private provision of military services is 
competitive and involves numerous players in a market offers the civilian principal 
greater flexibility of this kind than when dealing with the monopoly agent that is the 
state military force. 
A second relevant point here is that, given that in a democracy civilians 'have the 
right to be wrong', there should in a democratic society be a preference for agents that 
will be more responsive to civilian directives. Given that, as we have seen, the 
strategic preference of the state military is well-paid inactivity, while the strategic 
preference of the private military company is active employment, there seems to be at 
least a small reason to prefer the private agent in this regard. 
A related point that favours the use of private military agents by civilian principals is 
the fact that private military companies have no special societal status, unlike their 
state military counterparts. As we saw in the previous chapter, the state military agent 
has a unique moral status in society, as a result of her willingness to make the ultimate 
sacrifice for her country. This can give the state military agent leverage should she 
seek to resist civilian direction. In Feaver's words, "the moral ambiguity of the 
relationship bolsters the hand of a military agent should he choose to resist civilian 
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direction" (Feaver 2003, 71-72). The private military company has no such moral 
status, despite potentially carrying out precisely the same missions and carrying 
precisely the same level of risk as the state military. Once again it seems that the 
private military agent is, at least in principle, likely to be more responsive to civilian 
direction than the state military agent. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are two further preferences that the state 
military agent is assumed to hold by Agency Theory. The first is the preference for 
honour. As I considered this in Chapter Two, I will not address this issue in depth 
here. It is however worth making one additional point on this matter. As Feaver points 
out, "[h]onor permeates the famous concept of small-group cohesion, the factor that 
makes human beings willing to risk their lives" (Feaver 2003, 73). Numerous authors 
argue that the heart of small-group cohesion in military forces is commitment to one's 
buddies in the group, rather than commitment to broader ideals. If this is indeed 
true, then there is little reason to think that private units will by their nature lack the 
cohesion necessary for battlefield success. 
The final essential preference displayed by the state military is the preference for 
maximal autonomy. In Agency Theory terms, this autonomy acts as a substitute for 
profit sharing. Autonomy is what the state military receives in exchange for obedience 
to the civilian principal - this is the heart of Huntington's notion of 'objective 
control'. But as we saw previously Kohl points out that "while "objective" civilian 
control might minimize military involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian 
control over military affairs" (Kohn 1997, 143). The same does not go for the private 
62 See for example the account of the complexities of battle-motivation in chapter 7 of Richard Holmes' 
classic work, Firing Line (1985). 
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military company, where it is profit rather than autonomy that is the key preference. 
While this does not mean that autonomy is not a value for the private military agent, 
there is good reason to expect that the private military agent will be willing to trade 
autonomy for profit, thereby potentially increasing civilian control. Once again, 
therefore, it seems that the private military company looks somewhat better than the 
state military agent from the perspective of a civilian principal who is aware of 
Agency Theory. 
Information Asymmetries, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Civil-
Military Relations 
Principal-agent relationships involve information asymmetries. Both sides 
share common information; in the civil-military context, they know who the 
domestic players are, the size of the defense budget, the general identity and 
nature of their enemies. They also share a common history and political 
memory. But each has private information that is discerned only dimly by the 
other. (Feaver 2003, 69) 
In the case of civil-military relations, the private information held by state military 
forces includes expert knowledge on issues like weapons system capabilities, tactics, 
logistics and morale, as well as inside knowledge regarding the general attitude within 
the military towards the directives of the civilian principal. For civilians, the private 
information includes insight into political realities and preferences. Overall, however, 
as Feaver points out, "information asymmetries favor the [state] military agent" 
(Feaver 2003, 69). This is particularly so when the state military is deployed and 
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engaged in combat operations - the very nature of distant and chaotic engagements 
makes it extremely difficult for civilians to monitor the military. 
Is the information asymmetry between state military forces and civilian principals 
matched by a similar asymmetry between private military companies and their state 
employers? Certainly, at the most basic level, the question must be answered in the 
affirmative. As Feaver implies in the quote at the beginning of this section, the very 
nature of the principal-agent relationship ensures the existence of some informational 
asymmetry. But there are significant differences between the private military 
company and the state military force that suggest that the asymmetry might be less 
pronounced in the case of the private military company. For one thing, as discussed in 
the previous section, the substitution of autonomy for profit in the case of the state 
military force increases the likelihood that the state military force will be more 
resistant to civilian monitoring than will the private military company. For another 
thing, the nature of the market for the private provision of force increases the 
incentive for private companies to seek to earn the trust (and therefore the contracts) 
of the civilian principals by making themselves as open to the civilians as possible. 
Christopher Kinsey, for example, argues that the future success of private military 
companies will be determined more on how much 'corporate social responsibility' 
they display than on their ability to find new markets (Kinsey forthcoming 2008). 
Avant agrees: "Conceptions of proper behavior, such as the codes of conduct and 
standards in vogue among advocates of corporate social responsibility, can be 
important in setting expectations and norms within which the market works" (Avant 
2005, 220). 
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Apart from information asymmetries, principal-agent interactions in general, and 
civil- military relations in particular, are also afflicted by the adverse selection 
problem and moral hazard. As Feaver explains: 
Adverse selection refers to the moment of hiring in the employer metaphor. 
Has the employer hired someone who is naturally a hard worker or has he 
been deceived by the interview and hired a lout? Just how closely aligned are 
the preferences of the agent and the principal? The adverse selection problem 
means, in the first instance, that the employer cannot know for certain about 
the true preferences and capabilities of the applicant. But adverse selection is 
more than mere uncertainty about the applicant. It also refers to the fact that 
the very act of hiring creates perverse incentives for the agent to misrepresent 
himself, which thereby increases the chances that the principal will hire a lout: 
it is hard to verify the true type, and the lout has a great incentive to appear 
even more attractive than a good worker. ... More generally, adverse selection 
can extend beyond the hiring phase to include all those situations in which the 
agent presents himself, or some proposal, to the principal for approval or 
decision. For instance, it means that because of their informational advantage 
over superiors, subordinates tend to propose policies that benefit their own 
interests rather than the interests of the superiors. (Feaver 2003, 72 - 23) 
While adverse selection does not confront the traditional civil-military relationship in 
a direct way, given that the civilian principal is not faced with a choice as to which 
agent to employ, Feaver points out that in this context the problem appears when 
civilians decide on which military officers to promote to senior rank. There are 
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particular difficulties here because the personality of a person who is likely to succeed 
on the battlefield is not one that succumbs comfortably to oversight by civilians who, 
in military matters at least, are in all likelihood her inferiors. As Feaver observes, 
"[o]ne of the major concerns of traditional civil-military relations theory was 
precisely the great divergence of viewpoint between what Huntington called the 
liberal civilian ideology and the military mind" (Feaver 2003, 73). 
The other area where adverse selection appears in the traditional civil-military 
relationship is in the budget process, in which the civilian 'selects' what warfighting 
capability it will pay for, on the basis of proposals put forward by state military 
organizations. "Again, because the military has an information advantage it can 
advance artfully drawn proposals that appear to meet civilian needs but in reality are 
tailored to its own interests. In the extreme, adverse selection might lead civilians to 
adopt policies they think will increase the military's ability to protect society but that 
in fact will increase the ability or even the propensity of the military to undermine 
society" (Feaver 2003, 74). 
Peter W. Singer, for one, thinks that the adverse selection problem is particularly 
problematic for states that employ private military companies: 
This issue of adverse selection becomes particularly worrisome when placed 
in the context of the industry, with its layers of moral hazard and diffused 
responsibilities. Thus, even if PMF's are scrupulous in screening out their 
hires for human rights violations (which is difficult for a firm to accomplish, 
given that most of its prospective employees' resumes do not have an 
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"atrocities committed" section), it is still difficult for them to monitor their 
troops in the field completely. (Singer 2003, 222) 
I will examine the specifics of monitoring in the next chapter. For our purposes here 
the interesting question is whether the fact that adverse selection is only indirectly 
applicable to traditional civil - (state) military relations (because of the state 
military's monopoly on the provision of military forces) is something that shows that 
Agency Theory's applicability to private military companies is limited? 
Once again the obvious rejoinder is that it is the relationship between the private 
military company and its civilian state employer that is the paradigm case of the 
principal-agent relationship, and it is the traditional civil- (state) military relationship 
that must be manoeuvred somewhat to fit this framework. The adverse selection 
problem very clearly applies when the state is choosing which private military 
company to employ, in exactly the same way as it applies when the state is choosing 
which contractor of any type to employ. This problem is exactly that, a problem. But 
as Feaver makes clear it is a problem that applies in the context of state military forces 
as well, and it is one that in that context can be addressed by some or all of the 
mechanisms I will consider in the next chapter. It remains to be seen whether the 
same or similar endeavours on the part of the civilian principal will successfully 
address the problem as it appears in the civil - (private) military context. 
I come finally, and most briefly, to moral hazard. 
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Moral hazard refers to the behavior of the employee once hired. Like adverse 
selection, moral hazard refers at a general level to the problem that principals 
cannot completely observe the true behavior of the agent and so cannot be 
certain whether the agent is working or shirking. It has an additional 
specialized meaning based on the perverse incentives in the agency 
relationship. Employees have an incentive to shirk rather than work; if you can 
get paid for doing less, why do more? The principal, of course, tries to 
minimize shirking because it is inefficient" (Feaver 2003, 74). 
Moral hazard afflicts the civil- (state) military relationship in a more direct way than 
adverse selection. Because moral hazard is structurally very similar to the adverse 
selection problem, albeit applied downstream, it seems clear that the comments made 
above apply equally well here, so I will not belabour the point by repeating them. 
In sum, what is missed by many critics of private military companies is that their 
concern over the impact of military privatisation on civil-military relations ignores the 
fact that civil-military relations are by their very nature fraught. Feaver's analysis 
leads to the expectation that "this principal-agent relationship [i.e. that between 
civilian principals and state military forces] should be particularly characterized by 
distrust and friction, and any equilibria of delegation and control are unlikely to 
endure, giving way to new arrangements as costs and benefits shift" (Feaver 2003, 
72). As we have seen in this chapter, it appears that not only do private military 
companies not fundamentally part company with state military forces over the nature 
of their relationship with civilian principals, but on some counts private military 
companies also fare slightly better (from the perspective of the civilian principal) 
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within that relationship. Better, that is, from a broad conceptual point of view. It may 
well turn out, however, that things look less rosy for the private supplier of military 
force when the crucial and more specific issues of monitoring and punishment are 
considered. It is to that task I turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Civil - (Private) Military Relations: Monitoring and Punishment 
The civil-military relations literature, which specifically examines the control of 
force, reflects attention to all three dimensions of control evident in the debate over 
private security: functional, political, and social. Those who emphasized the 
functionality of force use a military's ability to deploy coercion effectively to defend 
the state's interests as the standard by which to measure control. Others claim that 
not only should forces defend the state's interest, they should do so within the bounds 
of received political structures. Still others have judged control by the military's 
fidelity to the larger social context - the degree to which the military has achieved a 
meaningful integration with social values. Scholars of privatization refer to a similar 
range of meanings when evaluating privatization's merits on other issue areas. (Avant 
2005, 41) 
We saw in the previous chapter that the strategic tension that is at the heart of the 
traditional civil-military relationship, as described by Agency Theory, is essentially 
the same challenge as that faced when civilian principals outsource to private military 
companies. In the traditional case, Agency Theory shows that this challenge is not 
insurmountable, and that various mechanisms are available to the civilian principal by 
which to manage the state military agent. As Feaver points out, "[a] central premise of 
political applications of the principal-agent framework is that despite all of the 
foregoing problems, political control does not end with the delegation decision. 
Civilians still have the means available with which to direct the military and thereby 
mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in delegation" 
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(Feaver 2003, 75). Two main types of control mechanisms are available to civilian 
principals: monitoring mechanisms and punishment mechanisms. These mechanisms 
and their sub-variants are not to be considered as competing options from which 
civilians would choose one or two. Instead civilians would use a mixture which would 
have a cumulative effect. 
In this chapter we consider whether the private military company can be controlled in 
a similar way to the state military force. Concerns in this respect abound, as Singer 
illustrates: 
Public military forces have all manner of traditional controls over their 
activities, ranging from internal checks and balances, domestic laws regulating 
the activities of the military force and its personnel, parliamentary scrutiny, 
public opinion, and numerous aspects of international law. [Private military 
companies], however, are only subject to the laws of the market. ... Other 
than its shareholders, there are no real checks and balances on a [private 
military company]" (Singer 2003, 220). 
Whether or not private military companies can in principle be controlled is something 
I will explore in this chapter. It is however worth noting from the outset that one of 
the reasons some states have turned to private military forces is precisely because of 
difficulties in controlling state forces. Eboe Hutchful, for example writes that 
... the phenomenon of privatisation of force paradoxically also reflects the 
security needs of the state itself, given its historically problematic (and 
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declining) ability to project force; private armies ... may replace or 
supplement official armies, which have proven to be difficult to control 
politically, as well as unreliable on the field of battle. (Hutchful 2000, 222) 
Of course it may turn out that 'private armies' are by their nature even more difficult 
to control than state forces. It is to an analysis of this question that I now turn. 
Monitoring 
We saw in chapter three that Feaver outlines six main means by which civilians can 
monitor state military forces: restricting the scope of delegation; contractual 
incentives; screening and selection mechanisms; 'fire alarms'; 'police patrols'; and 
revocation of delegated authority. In this section I will examine each of these in turn 
and assess their applicability to the case of civil - (private) military relations. Singer 
expresses a widespread concern in this regard when he writes: 
Lost oversight is the first issue of concern. When governments engage in 
official military and foreign policy endeavors, the policy is held accountable 
by a wide range of supervision, both from within their own agencies and in the 
competitive branches of government, such as the legislative and the judiciary. 
The result is a balance that keeps each branch within the law and holds their 
relative power in check. ... [T]his particular form of privatization removes 
military expertise from the realm of public accountability. (Singer 2003, 214-
215) 
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Because the focus of this thesis is on a conceptual analysis of civil - (private) military 
relations, I will not here consider such issues as the cost to principals of the various 
monitoring mechanisms discussed. As Feaver points out, "[l]ike traditional principal-
agent oversight mechanisms, these measures are costly in terms of civilian attention 
(not to mention dollars) but can mitigate somewhat the informational asymmetries in 
the civil-military relationship" (Feaver 2003, 85). If this analysis shows that similar 
monitoring mechanisms are available to the civilian principal in asserting control over 
private military companies, then it seems likely that there will be considerable costs in 
operationalising these mechanisms as well. It is a matter of practical policy, rather 
than conceptual analysis, whether or not civilians choose to pay the price necessary to 
have control over their military agents (whether state or private), and what degree of 
control civilians consider to provide the optimal balance between cost and outcome. 
One point is clear from the beginning - governments that choose not to engage with 
the private military industry give up any chance whatsoever of monitoring or 
controlling it. As Deborah Avant puts it: "Governments that have chosen to reduce 
their reliance on the private sector for sovereign tasks (such as South Africa) have 
abandoned their capacity to affect the development of the market's ecology" (Avant 
2005, 220). 
Restricting the scope of delegation to the military 
Consider the most obvious form of monitoring: restricting the scope of 
delegation to the military. Some degree of agency is inevitable in modern 
civil-military relations. Not everyone can go to the battlefield to fight. But in 
theory any amount of delegation short of that basic distinction is possible. 
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Force management can be broken down into three broad categories: strategy, 
structure, and operations. These broad categories can be further broken down 
into still smaller discrete steps. (Feaver 2003, 75 - 76) 
This form of monitoring depends on the degree to which civilians are prepared to take 
on some of the tasks involved in tasking and mobilising the military. This ranges from 
devising strategy, at the upper end, all the way down to determining specific tactics in 
small unit engagements (as President Johnson notoriously did during the Vietnam 
war). Technological advances in areas such as communications, command and control 
systems, satellite reconnaissance assets and unmanned aerial vehicles all offer the 
civilian principal far greater potential for control of this kind than has ever before 
been possible. There are of course dangers here. Apart from the enormous cost of 
providing for civilian oversight of every military move, there is the not insignificant 
danger that civilians will not have the necessary competence. As Feaver points out, 
"[i]n the extreme, overmeddling could so jeopardize the lives of the military, or the 
fate of the mission, that the military would turn in revolt" (Feaver 2003, 76). On the 
other hand, stepping right back and letting the military make every decision would 
amount to a de facto coup, and would also not be an acceptable arrangement. 
Feaver points out that in the state military context this form of monitoring is achieved 
by means of such mechanisms as rules of engagement, standing orders, mission orders 
and contingency plans. 
Rules of engagement, in principal-agent terms, are reporting requirements 
concerning the use of force. By restricting military autonomy and proscribing 
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certain behavior, rules of engagement require that the military inform civilian 
principals about battlefield operations whenever developments indicate (to 
battlefield commanders) that the rules need to be changed. (Feaver 2003, 77) 
Like state military forces, private military companies can be (and are) monitored by 
restricting the scope of delegation. In the latter case, this is generally done through 
contractual arrangements. These contracts set the scope of what the private military 
company must, can, and cannot do. When changing environmental conditions require 
these restrictions to be amended, contracts must be renegotiated with the civilian 
principal, thereby alerting the civilian to battlefield conditions and the behaviour of 
the private military company. As with the state military, it is up to the civilian 
principal to decide on how tight the restraints set by the contract are. 
Contractual incentives 
In the broader context of principal-agent theory, one of the key means of control 
available to the principal to control the agent is that of building performance-related 
economic incentives such as profit sharing into the contract that establishes the 
principal-agent relationship. Given that the civil- (state) military relationship is not 
one to which this sort of economic incentive can be directly applied, one or more 
proxies must be found.63 One option, as Feaver points out, is 'slack': 
the difference between the actual budget appropriation and the minimum cost 
of providing the service. Slack can be used to buy things that the agent 
(bureaucrat) wants, like new equipment, perquisites, and so on, but does not 
63 In some developing world countries state militaries do in fact directly involve themselves in 
economic ventures, often with the acquiescence of the civilian government. Where this happens, 
however, the effect is to reduce rather than enhance civilian control. See Howe 2001. 
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actually need to provide the service. In this way, the agent has an incentive to 
be efficient in providing the desired service, since he can spend the slack on 
things he values. (Feaver 2003, 77 - 78) 
But, says Feaver, slack offers no real guarantee that the agent will perform as the 
principal desires, and requires the principal to consistently overpay for services 
rendered. 
If slack is problematic, then the next closest proxy to profit sharing in Agency Theory 
is autonomy: 
[ajutonomy is slack without a monetary denomination. Since monitoring 
mechanisms vary in their degree of intrusiveness, and assuming that the 
military prefers less intrusive means, civilians have a powerful incentive with 
which to influence military behaviour: offer to use less intrusive means to 
monitor military agents. Indeed this is how traditional civil-military relations 
theory treats autonomy. (Feaver 2003, 78) 
This is certainly true, but it must be noted that autonomy is at best a problematic 
means for exerting control. In fact what it amounts to is a trade off between a loss of 
control over some aspects of military life in exchange for an increase in control over 
other aspects of the military. 
No such trade-off is necessary in the case of the private military company. As we 
have already seen, while all organisations value autonomy, the central value of the 
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private military company is profit. There is therefore every reason to think that the 
private military company operating in a competitive environment will be quite 
prepared to trade autonomy for profit. Thus control is not simply shifted from one 
area to another, but increased overall. Avant points out some of the broad advantages 
of contractual incentives when she writes that 
State leaders can also use markets to generate social control. Many analyses 
have focused on state efforts within international organizations or regimes to 
set agendas, influence standards, link issues and exercise leadership to 
enhance the chance that policy results will reflect their values. States can also 
gain social control of private force, though, with their consumption patterns. 
Not only do state purchases of security services affect the incentives for 
[private military companies] to reflect that state's interests abroad, they also 
communicate the state's values and standards for proper behavior by a [private 
military company]. Through procurement and other efforts to set and 
communicate standards and educate the private sector as to the proper modes 
of security service provision, then, states can also influence the ecology of the 
global market for security services. States that choose not to participate in 
these efforts essentially give up this influence - allowing other states, IOs, 
INGOs and corporations to play a greater role in shaping the ecology of the 
global market. (Avant 2005, 68 - 69) 
Screening and selection mechanisms 
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A slightly more intrusive form of monitoring involves using screening and 
selection mechanisms to ensure that only the right sort of agent enters into the 
contractual relationship. This directly addresses the adverse selection problem, 
but it may be thought of as a relatively unintrusive information-gathering 
device. The way to make sure you have not hired a lout is to identify the 
characteristics of people who are not louts and then hire only them. Once you 
"know" the type of agent you have, you should be able to predict his behavior 
with greater confidence. (Feaver 2003, 78) 
Once again this mechanism in the general principal-agent framework is not directly 
available in the civil- (state) military relations context, where the state military has a 
monopoly on the supply of military force. The proxy in this context is accession 
policy, the screening and selection of recruits and the promotion of personnel who 
show themselves to share civilian preferences. The latter has, of course, its 
limitations. As Feaver points out, "Changes of administration can result in changes in 
the degree of convergence between the officers appointed by a previous 
administration and the incoming civilian leaders" (Feaver 2003, 79). 
Related to accession policy is organisational culture. Military organisations, at least 
the established military organs of developed-world countries, are perhaps unique in 
the degree to which a culture of obedience is a fundamental feature of the 
In a few exceptional cases civilian governments are in a position to choose between similarly-
capable branches of the military. In the US case, for example, the Marine Corps is a meaningful 
alternative to the Army for land warfare, Army Aviation's helicopter and transport assets can compete 
in some areas with the Air Force, and Navy and Marine Corps Aviation can also compete with the Air 
Force. An interesting case in point was the Vietnam War deployment of Marine Corps units in roles the 
Army argued they were better suited for. 
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organisational culture. This is definitely an important feature of ensuring that state 
military forces 'work' rather than 'shirk'. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Feaver is 
right when he concludes that "Compared with agency relationships in other sectors of 
the bureaucracy ... civilian principals have less discretion in using screening and 
selection to choose military agents" (Feaver 2003, 79). 
This is simply not the case with private military agents. In a competitive market for 
force, civilian principals have genuine choice regarding which agent to contract with, 
and the screening and selection mechanisms available to them are precisely the same 
as those generally available in the commercial market-place. This, at least 
conceptually, provides civilian principals with far greater flexibility in choosing an 
agent to do their bidding. Instead of each new administration being 'stuck' with the 
state military institutions it inherits, in the case of private firms the option is available 
to contract with an entirely new batch of private military companies. 
Another point worth making here is that the broader marketplace for force acts as a 
screening mechanism that stretches beyond the efforts of the individual state. As 
Avant points out, "Even if the state is not concerned with international values, the 
firm, not the state, exercises control over the personnel it deploys. The firm is more 
likely to be concerned with international norms and the professional behavior of its 
personnel, particularly if acquiescence to these is important to its reputation (and 
future contracts)" (Avant 2005, 61). Because state forces do not operate within a 
65 The exception clause here is important. This is not the case in the military forces of new and 
emerging democracies (see for example Howe 2001). While many developed-world attempts to 
'professionalise' military forces in such countries focus on trying to 'inject' this culture of obedience 
(which took generations to develop in their own militaries) into the newcomers, I argue elsewhere 
(Baker 2007 forthcoming) that applying the broader framework of Agency Theory provides the 
opportunity to put in place the 'hard' determinants of appropriate civil - (state) military relations, while 
giving the time for the 'soft' determinants like organisational culture to develop. 
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marketplace, such pressures only apply in a far weaker and indirect way to them, if 
they apply at all. This must, therefore, be considered to be an advantage for the 
private military industry. 
'Fire alarms' 
Fire alarms are third parties who have an interest in the behaviour of the agent in 
question, and who therefore monitor the agent. When the agent is believed to be 
shirking, the interest-group concerned alerts the principal to the alleged misbehaviour. 
The most important fire-alarm in the traditional civil-military context is the news 
media. This is one of the many reasons why a strong and independent news media is 
essential to a flourishing democracy. Defence-orientated 'think tanks' are also 
important fire-alarms, and tend to offer a greater depth of analysis than the news 
media and, indeed, often trigger news media 'alarms'. 
In addition, Feaver singles out less formal, but nevertheless also important, groupings 
within the state military that contribute to this form of monitoring. In a conscription-
based military, Feaver points out, "draftees, as resident civilians whose primary 
identity and loyalty is with civilian society, may be expected to sound the alarm if 
things are going awry" (Feaver 2003, 80). Conscription is increasingly rare among 
major state militaries. At the same time, however, the employment of reserve forces is 
on the increase, and it is at least arguable that reservists' dual identities also increase 
their likelihood of sounding the alarm when serious cases of shirking come to their 
attention. Another 'internal' fire-alarm that can play a role is that of inter-service 
rivalry. Where the state military is composed of independent services (army, air force, 
navy, marines and the like) of relatively similar strength and standing, competition 
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between these services can encourage them to blow the whistle on one another when 
they detect shirking. Being within the same overall military structures and being 
experts in the delivery of armed force means that services often do not have the same 
informational disadvantages as the civilian principals they serve. "To the extent that 
the existence of separate services makes carrying out a coup that much more difficult, 
the services can be treated as separate sub-veto groups" (Feaver 2003, 82). This 
potential benefit to civilian principals is, however, balanced by the possibility that the 
services will collude in order to keep their shirking from the civilians, what is 
sometimes known as 'logrolling'.66 
As the slew of reports in the recent news-media testifies, private military companies 
are also subject to the wailing of this particular 'fire alarm', and this industry has also 
been the focal point of a number of in-depth research projects carried out by defence-
related think tanks. In some respects, however, the nature of the private military 
industry makes it harder for the news-media and think-tanks to keep track of the 
behaviour of its constituent firms. Private military companies are numerous and come 
in and out of existence in a way completely unlike the arms and units of state 
militaries. On the other hand, private military companies have fewer means at their 
disposal to prevent employees from communicating with the news media. Violators 
cannot be jailed, for example, as can state military employees who violate direct 
orders. Furthermore, government contracts in a democracy are generally open to some 
degree of public scrutiny, which gives the news-media and think-tanks access to 
66 Feaver points out that inter-service rivalry can also be thought of as an 'institutional check': 
"Institutional checks are related to fire alarms, but the principal-agent literature usually treats them as 
distinct. An institutional check is a separate agent, established by the principal and empowered with a 
veto to block action of the other agent. The function of a simple fire alarm is to alert the principal, who 
will then intervene to punish or adjust behavior as needed. The function of an institutional check is 
more assertive - to block, either legally or in some cases physically, any behavior that might be 
considered untoward." (Feaver 2003, 81) 
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important information relevant to civil- (private) military relations. In addition, the 
competitive nature of the private military industry makes it essential that companies 
develop and maintain a publicly accessible profile. 
It is an open question whether the employees of private military companies are more 
or less likely to operate as fire-alarms than draftees or reservists in state military 
forces. Like draftees private military contractors do not draw their identity primarily 
from any particular group, for as commercial agents they remain always open to being 
employed by another company for greater reward. What is clear is that the market for 
the private provision for force presents a far greater chance of companies raising 
alarms about one another's behaviour than does the relatively limited competition 
between services. In particular, competitive bidding for contracts is an excellent 
mechanism by which to highlight things like exaggerated risk assessments, inflated 
cost estimates and the like. It has of course in recent times been noted by critics of the 
private military industry that important contracts have been awarded on a non-
competitive basis, and that this undermines transparency. Again it is important here to 
reiterate the point that I am addressing the question of the conceptual possibility of 
applying Agency Theory to civil - (private) military relations. If, in concrete policy 
decisions, governments choose not to avail themselves of the mechanisms for control 
described by Agency Theory, this in no way undermines the claim that these 
mechanisms are available in concept. 
'Police patrols' 
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The next most intrusive form of monitoring has been dubbed "police patrol" 
monitoring. This involves regular investigations of the agent by the principal -
fishing expeditions, if you will, where the quarry is general information on 
what the agent is doing. Police patrols include regularized audits and intrusive 
reporting requirements designed to turn up evidence of agent wrongdoing and, 
through regularized inspection, to deter moral hazard. (Feaver 2003, 84) 
In the traditional civil- (state) military context, police patrols are usually carried out 
by civilian employees of the nation's Department of Defence, or equivalent. In the 
case of South Africa, for example, it was considered an important step forward for 
democratic control of the South African military that a separate Department of 
Defence with a minister and secretariat was created in the aftermath of the 1994 
transition to democracy. Feaver points out that the size of the civilian staff of the 
department is a good indication of the degree of monitoring of the military by the 
civilian principals. Inspectors general fall somewhere between the category of 'police 
patrol' and that of the 'fire alarm': "On the one hand, they are internal to the 
organization and have full audit authority; on the other hand, an inspector general's 
investigation is not a regularized audit and is usually triggered by some precipitating 
factor, like a leak" (Feaver 2003, 84). 
While governments have been slow to designate officials specifically responsible for 
'patrolling' the private military industry, there is no reason in principal why this could 
not happen. Once again it seems to be simply a matter of how much control the 
civilian principal chooses to exercise. Indeed, the recent controversy over the incident 
of 16 September 2007 in which Blackwater USA employees were accused of killing 
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13 civilians in Baghdad provides a telling example. In the wake of this incident 
Blackwater was the subject of a Congressional enquiry (the outcome of which has not, 
at time of writing become apparent), efforts have been made to tighten up the laws 
under which private military and security contractors in Iraq operate, and, in a literal 
example of civilian monitoring of the private military and security sector, Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice has ordered video cameras to be mounted in Blackwater 
vehicles, federal agents to accompany Blackwater contractors protecting Department 
of State diplomatic convoys, and all radio traffic involving Blackwater to be 
recorded. 7 
Revocation of delegated authority 
The most intrusive form of monitoring outlined by Feaver takes the form of the 
withdrawal of some authority that was originally extended to the state military agent 
by the civilian principal. This can either be a complete withdrawal (by, for example, 
re-delegating a particular area of responsibility to a competing arm of the state, such 
as the police or intelligence community), or a partial withdrawal, in which the civilian 
agency involved takes on greater powers over, for example, the planning of military 
operations. In a similar way, civilian principals clearly have the option of removing 
responsibilities from private military companies when those companies show signs of 
shirking. 
Punishment 
'Rice Issues New Rules for Blackwater', Associated Press, October 8 2007. 
http .'/www.militarv corn/NewsContent'0,13319,151878.00 .htmPESRC =eb.nl (accessed 12 October 
2007) 
137 
Feaver points out that, in the general principal-agent literature, punishment 
mechanisms are given little attention, and punishment is largely taken for granted. In 
the standard economic model punishment is relatively simple - shirking agents have 
financial or other penalties imposed upon them or are fired. This is not, however, so 
straightforward in the civil- (state) military context. As Feaver points out, 
[o]ne of the distinctives of the civil-military relationship is that fact that the 
subordinate is almost always more powerful than the superior. This is always 
true in the most basic sense of brute force. It can even be true for more 
tangible measures of power. The military may have tremendous political 
power because it is an important consumer block in a market economy. 
Likewise, the military can enjoy a prestige that confers political power quite 
apart from any consideration of physical coercion. (Feaver 2003, 89) 
Given the power available to state military forces, there is a real question whether 
civilian principals can punish their military agents unless those agents choose to 
accede to the punishments. The threat of coups is a real one, and one unique to the 
relationship between civilian principals and their military agents, whether state or 
private. As we saw in Chapter Two, there is no particular reason to think that private 
warriors would be more inclined than their state bretheren to attempt to overthrow 
elected governments. Indeed, given that their motives tend to be pecuniary rather than 
political, it may even be thought that there is less of a danger of this sort of behaviour 
from private warriors. 
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Coups aside, Feaver recognises that civilians can and do punish their state military 
agents, and he outlines five main means by which this can be done. As one of those 
means is intrusive monitoring (as a form of punishment), and I have addressed 
monitoring above, I will consider only the remaining four means in what remains of 
this chapter. As before, the goal is to discern whether there is any important difference 
in the applicability of this dimension of Agency Theory to the context of the private 
provision of force. Once again the focus here will be on the conceptual applicability 
of these punishment options rather than on the financial or other practical implications 
of implementing them. 
Budget cuts and withdrawal of privileges 
One of the ways in which civilian principals can show their disapproval of their 
military agents' shirking is by reducing or withholding funding to those agents. In the 
US case, for example, Congress will often punish one of the branches of the military 
by cutting budgets for high-prestige projects, such as the development of advanced 
weaponry and equipment. In a similar way the military can be punished by 
withdrawing some or other privilege from them. For example, President Clinton was 
widely perceived as punishing the military by cutting senior military personnel out of 
important policy decisions during his term in office. 
While private military companies do not have this sort of privilege, nonetheless it is 
conceivable that private military companies could be punished in a similar way. For 
example a company that was contracted to train a highly prestigious unit such as the 
US Navy SEALs would lose considerably more than the contract payments were that 
contract withdrawn. Prestige is an important and valued commodity in a competitive 
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marketplace. It is clear, in addition, that financial penalties are an obvious way to 
punish wayward private military agents. It is worth reiterating that this is a conceptual 
point. If the reality is that there is in fact no competitive market for force, then 
obviously this point does not apply. Certainly it is the view of some analysts that 
genuine market mechanisms are in fact not in place much of the time. As Herbert 
Wulf points out "real competition is essential to prevent companies from maximising 
their profit-seeking strategies. But in reality this competition is often lacking" (Wulf 
forthcoming 2008). 
'Forced detachment from the military' 
In the broader principal-agent context the most obvious means of punishing a shirking 
agent is by firing him or her. While civilian principals do not have the option of 
'firing' the state military, there are various ways within the military career system of 
forcibly detaching particular soldiers, sailors, marines or airmen from the military. 
Options range from the US military's 'up-or-out' career path system, in which 
military personnel who do not achieve promotion within a set time-limit are 
discharged from the service; to forcing a disgraced officer to retire at a rank lower 
than that achieved, resulting in a significant financial loss; to a range of administrative 
discharges. In the private military context the general principal-agent option of 
'firing' the shirking firm is quite clearly available. 
Military justice 
Agency Theory recognises a range of punishments that are unique to the civil-military 
context. Unlike the standard principal-agent relationship, civilian principals in a 
democratic state have the option of applying military-specific penal codes to their 
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state military agents. If convicted of offences under military law (such as the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice which applies to US military personnel) state military 
personnel face punishments ranging from dismissal from the military to imprisonment 
to, in some extreme circumstances, execution. 
It has been a source of significant concern among critics of the private military 
industry that private military companies and their employees are not subject to the 
same rigorous standards of justice as state military employees. While this might be a 
concrete problem relevant to recent experience of the private military industry, there 
is no conceptual reason why civilian principals cannot either put in place penal codes 
that apply to private military companies and their employees, or else expand existing 
military law to cover private military contractors. In fact, this is precisely what is 
beginning to happen. In 2006 the US Congress extended the scope of the UCMJ to 
ensure its applicability to private military contractors, and it has recently been 
reported that, on the 2nd of August 2007, the US House Judiciary approved a bill 
which, if successful, "would place contractors operating in support of US military 
operations under US criminal jurisdiction and would direct the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to stand up field units to probe allegations of criminal misconduct 
or abuse in places such as Iraq or Afghanistan" (Hodge 2007, 15). While it remains to 
be seen whether this move will withstand the inevitable legal challenges that will 
arise, it does indicate that there is no reason in principle why civilian principals 
cannot use penal codes to punish private military agents for extreme forms of 
shirking. 
Extralegal civilian action 
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that many critics of the private military industry have expressed concerns, pointing 
out that private warriors are not subject to the same penal codes that are so important 
in ensuring that state-employed soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines toe the line. We 
saw that while this is certainly true of the current legislative environment, recent 
moves to bring private military companies and their employees under military and 
civilian penal codes are indicative that this is simply a shortcoming of existing 
legislation, and that there is no conceptual reason why the private purveyors of force 
cannot be subject to some equivalent of a military code of justice. 
It bears repeating, as I bring this thesis to a close, that the focus here has been on the 
conceptual nature of the relationship between the elected civilian leaders of 
democracies and their chosen military servants, whether state or private. In this regard 
there seems no significant obstacle to the employment of private military companies, 
at least none that is not already a problem with the employment of state military 
forces. That said, the claims made in this thesis are in no way intended to minimise 
the very real practical and political challenges that may well mean that private 
military companies, while not unduly problematic in principle, could present a serious 
problem for appropriate civil-military relations. But of course this is (once again) true 
of many real-world state military forces. 
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